‘Devolution of corruption’ can give accidental birth to unity

Of all the articles in Kenya’s new Constitution, the one on which there was the most serious debate was probably on devolution.

During the referendum campaigns, opponents of the constitution argued that the devolution proposals would “divide the country further along tribes”. Then there was the more thoughtful view that the 47 counties, with their powerful governors and county assemblies, will be too costly.

The cynics meanwhile made a familiar, but compelling, point; that in corrupt countries like Kenya, all one achieves is to “devolve corruption”. We say familiar, because the criticism that when corrupt governments devolve power they also devolve corruption is a common one in countries with strong federal or state systems like Nigeria and India, too. Indeed, in Nigeria and India it is not just criticism, it is the reality.

Kenya therefore has reason to worry about how East Africa’s most ambitious devolution project will turn out. That said, Nigeria also proves that, for all its problems, devolution is often the best medicine for divided countries. By the time Nigeria became independent in 1960, it had already been divided by the British colonialists into three regions.

But even with that, many regions and ethnic groups still felt marginalised and mistreated. It was partly this alienation that led to the bitter 1967 -70 Biafran war in which more than 100,000 people were killed when the Igbo in the south-eastern part of the country sought to secede.

Biafra was defeated, but some lessons were learnt. In an attempt to minimise ethnic tension, nine more federal states were created. Since then, nearly every major crisis in Nigeria led to the creation of new federal states to appease the disgruntled elite. Today, this populous nation of 150 million has 36 states, headed by governors many of whom have been successfully prosecuted of corruption.

It was almost inevitable that following the election violence that engulfed Kenya after the December 2007 elections, in order to keep Kenya as one country, some power would have to be devolved to local groups. And, it would be naïve to expect that corruption will not come to the counties.

Political peculiarities

In fact the reform path Kenya has chosen, means that for the first years county government will have to content with corruption. This is because the political peculiarities of a country usually determine how it devolves power. To better appreciate this, compare Kenya and Rwanda.

First, the new Kenya constitution puts a stringent limit to the size of the Cabinet – 24. Secondly, it provides that it will be a technocratic cabinet, so MPs cannot be appointed. By so doing, Kenya has taken away an important tool for political stabilisation in Africa—the use of cabinet positions as patronage by the ruler to recruit loyalty.

This is a controversial area in African politics. In his “Politics and Political Patronage in Africa”, Leonardo R. Arriola, argues that evidence shows that patronage by way of Cabinet jobs, often has a significant stabilising effect on the politics of developing countries.

After examining various data, he concluded dramatically that: “Recruiting more ministers into the Cabinet is an effective coup-inhibiting strategy for the leader who fears being overthrown.Each additional cabinet appointment lowers the coup hazard by 23-25 per cent…” until you reach a point where the appointment of more ministers begins to be counterproductive.

The new constitution depoliticises and slims down the cabinet, and clips the wings of the “imperial presidency”, and by so doing takes quite a bit of power away from the president at the national level. The ability for future Kenyan governments to entrench themselves and stabilise their rule through patronage in Nairobi, has been considerably reduced.

However, politics abhors a vacuum, and so patronage has not ended. It has been sub-contracted to the counties where a large chunk of national resources and, therefore, power will now go. The stabilisation of Kenyan politics, therefore, will be pursued primarily at the counties through the localisation of corruption.

Rwanda did the opposite with its new constitution in 2001. It had 12 provinces (known as prefectures), but these were abolished and reorganised into only 5. A range of powers was then devolved to the fewer regions. Post-genocide politics required low levels of corruption to work (Rwanda is the least corrupt East African Community country), so it could reduce the provinces because patronage-driven politics was not productive.

Corruption has been the bane of African politics, however the examples above suggest that we need to examine why it arises in transition polities. Corruption arises when the fair distribution of national goods and public services through legal means collapses, and the process is captured by individuals and organised groups in the state and their allies in the private sector. Corruption, therefore, is a distribution channel. Illegal and criminal, but a distribution channel nevertheless.

Competing against each other

The first result of the persistence of corruption in highly devolved political systems is that it shifts the war over the goodies from the national to the regional levels. Again, we need look no further than India. In Kenya’s case, soon the counties will be competing against each other. And within counties, new power groups will be competing to grab.