Sudan: Will the North let him go?

Having bloodied her nose in Somalia, the United States is now trying to clean it right in Sudan as the 2011 referendum approaches. The question is, can the US help prevent Sudan from relapsing into war?

The Obama administration had earlier faced a barrage of criticism from Western civil society organisations for its policy of “constructive engagement” with Khartoum, rather than wielding the big stick.

Khartoum has since warmed up to the new approach, to the extent that, when the Sudanese delegation went for a UN High Level Meeting on Sudan, it carried with it three conditions that would enable Khartoum to ensure a democratic and legitimate referendum.

They included an agreement that the US lifts economic sanctions against Sudan, the US removes Sudan from the list of countries it considers to be sponsoring terrorism, and for Washington to help influence the deferment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant of arrest against President Omar al-Bashir.

President Obama and his Sudan policy team announced that the US had made Sudan a top priority and promised to provide leadership for implementation of the final phase of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and address the crisis in Darfur.

In his speech to the high-level meeting, President Obama clearly outlined two options that Sudan’s leaders might take. If Sudan reneged on past commitments and fosters violence, it would be met with negative consequences and deeper isolation from the international community.

But a Sudan which fulfils its obligations — including holding the upcoming referendum on independence for South Sudan and the status of Abyei on time; bringing concrete and lasting peace to Darfur; and holding accountable perpetrators of mass violence against civilians — will attract improved diplomatic relations, development support, and an easing of sanctions.

The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has declared a southern vote for secession to be inevitable. The question is whether the referendum will be held at all, or whether it will be credible.

Khartoum continues to assure the world that the referendum will take place as scheduled on January 9, 2011, but tardy preparations and the attitude of some key elements within the NCP indicate that Khartoum is not keen on the referendum taking place, or is laying the ground for its rejection of the outcome.

To begin with, the voter registration is yet to start, while there is no guarantee that the recently formed committee to fast-track a decision on the border between North and South will be ready in time before the referendum.

Then there is the issue of the oil-rich Abyei, which is supposed to hold its own referendum the same day to decide whether it belongs to the North or the South.
The Abyei Referendum Commission is yet to be constituted while, at the same time the Misseriya Arabs — who consider themselves northerners — are certain to take part in the referendum in the absence of an accepted North-South border.

NCP and SPLM had agreed, after much acrimony, that the referendum will pass if 50 per cent plus one opt for either separation or unity, but the vote will only be binding if 60 per cent of the registered voters take part. Initially, NCP had demanded 90 per cent participation, then came down to 65 and finally 60 per cent.

Poor communications and transport in the south make it difficult for 60 per cent of registered voters to cast their ballot, while widespread illiteracy and lack of familiarity with voting procedures make the casting of valid ballots even more challenging.

During the elections in April 2010, many voters in the South could not vote due to missing names or voter registers being sent to the wrong polling stations.

Some intellectuals in the South who saw through this scheme have been urging voters not to register if they know they will not be able to vote.

This is because a big number of registered voters and a low voter turn-out will ensure that the 60 per cent mark is not met.

Then there is the issue of insecurity in the South, brought about by the SPLM’s inability to disarm militia, some of who, it alleges, are being instigated by Khartoum.

A case in point is General George Athor of Jonglei State, who took up arms after losing the state governorship in the elections.