Annan has called the bluff on suspects against local trials

Internet chatter and reactions on the street suggests widespread excitement, or fear, that very soon key political leaders in Kenya, including very senior members of the cabinet, will face the indignity of being clamped in leg irons and handcuffs to be flown to The Hague to stand trial before the International Criminal Court.

The reality, however, is that it could be a few months before ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo acts on the list of names in the sealed envelope handed over to him on Thursday by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Mr Annan, who chaired the Panel of Eminent Africans that mediated a settlement to Kenya’s post-election crisis, explained that he had handed over the envelope following the agreement reached between Mr Ocampo and a Kenya government delegation on July 3.

Mr Ocampo gave Kenya until the end of September to indicate clear direction on local mechanism for trying post-election violence suspects.

The delegation — Justice minister Mutula Kilonzo, Lands minister James Orengo (as representatives of the PNU and ODM faction, respectively) in the coalition government, and Attorney-General Amos Wako — had travelled to Geneva to meet with Mr Annan on July 2 and to meet Mr Ocampo at the Hague the following day.

The original attempt for a Special Tribunal had been thrown out by parliament in February, and since then it had become increasingly clear that powerful leaders from both sides of the political divide had ganged up to frustrate such a mechanism.

While President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga were keen to have a Special Tribunal established locally, key leaders, with agriculture minister William Ruto at the forefront, were openly agitating against such an eventuality.

The issue of trial for post-election violence suspects was one of the key ingredients to the bad blood in ODM between Mr Odinga and Mr Ruto, with the latter’s supporters openly accusing the Prime Minister of betraying the Kalenjin political bloc that supported him so strongly at the 2007 elections and therefore helped his ascendancy to his present high office.

The irony is that from the other side of the national divide, a central Kenya bloc seen to be led by Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta was also against the Special Tribunal and preferred the Hague option.

While Mr Ruto was undisputed leader of the Kalenjin grouping at the elections, Mr Kenyatta had merely assumed more prominence than other Central Province leaders as President Kibaki retreated to State House at the height of the post-election violence and the Kikuyu looked for a champion to rally the troops in the face of widespread evictions in the Rift Valley.

Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta therefore came to be seen as the leaders of the key antagonists in the Rift Valley theatre.

While Mr Kenyatta has not been as open and vocal as Mr Ruto in dismissing the Special Tribunal, some of his statements, and unequivocal pronouncements by key allies and aides, left no doubt what he preferred.

It was ironical that the two presumed antagonists were united in support for the Hague option; and doubly ironical that they were widely reported to be re-crafting their old political alliance.

The KK, or Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance, that their respective supporters talked about would have the ultimate aim of derailing Mr Odinga’s prospects come 2012.

Although Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta remained extremely coy about their intentions, MPs who acted as their unofficial spokesmen made it clear at every opportunity that an alliance was in the works.