Museveni’s vow to conquer al Shabaab easier said than done

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni visits a victim in Kampala's Mulago hospital on July 12, 2010 after twin bomb blasts tore through crowds of football fans watching the World Cup final, killing 64 people, including an American, and wounding scores others. Somalia's Shebab insurgent group claimed responsibility for overnight bomb blasts in Kampala that left at least 74 people dead. The Al Qaeda-inspired movement's top leader had warned in an audio message earlier this month that Uganda would face retaliation for its role in supporting the western-backed Somali transitional government. AFP PHOTO / PETER BUSOMOKE

President Yoweri Museveni’s vow to crush the Somali-based al Shabaab extremist group after the deadly bomb attacks in Kampala is typical of a leader who values his warrior credentials.

The Ugandan president said: “Our troops will pursue and crush al Shabaab right inside Somalia. We will commit up to 20,000 troops for the mission,” he said and vowed to eliminate the terror-linked group.

Even before the Uganda attacks, the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development had announced plans to send 2,000 more African Union peacekeeping troops to beef up the present 6,000-strong contingent supporting the beleaguered Transitional Federal Government’s hold on just a small section of Mogadishu.

The warrior in Museveni wants not just revenge, but to steeply escalate the mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission made up essentially of soldiers from Uganda and Burundi, the countries receiving threats from al Shabaab.

While the AU and IGAD may be strengthening the African Union Mission in Somalia to more effectively support the Transitional Government, President Museveni obviously wants to ‘eliminate’ al Shabaab.

The twin bomb attacks in Kampala bought home the stark reality that violent extremists in lawless Somalia have the capacity to export their brand of terror across the East African region.

It follows that countries in the region must recognise the cancer in their midst, and formulate the strategies to either cure it or cut it out.

Uganda was targeted by al Shabaab because it is the main contributor to the African Union peacekeeping contingent. Burundi has also received threats.

Other African countries that had pledged troops, including giant Nigeria, have baulked at putting their soldiers in harms way.

The rise of Islamic extremism in Somalia, particularly by al Shabaab and its claims to links with the al Qaeda, has put the dirt-poor country on the international radar.

Kenya has a long history of linkages to the Somali conflict starting with the secessionist campaign in the country by

Somali-speaking North Eastern Province in the early years of independence.

Remain steadfast

Neighbouring Ethiopia has had similar problems with its equally vast Ogaden Province also inhabited by Somalis.

Kenya is among the countries in the region that have condemned the Kampala bombings and has vowed to remain steadfast in the face of threats from Somalia.

The United States, the European Union and various other countries have pledged help to contain the menace coming out of Kampala.

It is in one thing, however, to pledge action, including retaliation or revenge.

It is quite another to take the concrete steps required to neutralise the threat of terrorism fuelled by religious extremism.

So far all efforts since the fall of the Siad Barre dictatorship to stabilise the lawless country or to contain the extremist menace have come to grief. In many cases efforts at outside intervention have made the situation worse.

An international coalition led by the United States tried to pacify Somalia in 1992 one year of the fall of the Siad Barre dictatorship, only to be run out of town with a very bloody nose.

The mighty Americans with their Humvees, tanks, attack helicopters and ship-based missiles faced the indignity , embarrassment and humiliation of being forced out of Somalia in 1994 by a bunch of irregulars in sandals and kanzus.

The military misadventure was aptly depicted in the hit movie, ‘Black Hawk Down’.

The Ethiopians were next, invading at the end of 2006 and marching all the way to Mogadishu to shore up the shaky Transitional Federal Government that had never effectively ruled since being cobbled under IGAD auspices in Nairobi two years earlier.

With an iron fist approach shaped by a history of conflict with their bitter enemy, Ethiopian troops succeeded in routing the Union of Islamic Courts radicals that had assumed control of most of Somalia as the Transitional Government failed to assert itself.

The irony is that the Islamic Courts administration, while seen by the western countries and neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia as composed of dangerous religious extremists, had succeeded to some extent in restoring a degree of peace and stability in the chaotic state.

It had even managed to contain the pirates by then establishing themselves as lords of the Indian Ocean water around Somalia.
There is a popular Somali verse:
‘Me and my clan against the world;
Me and my family against my clan;
Me and my brother against my family;
Me against my brother’

The net effect of the Ethiopian invasion was a replication of what happened during the presence of the American led UN mission.

The Somali put aside their fratricidal clan wars to unite against the common enemy, the outsider, the foreign interloper.

It’s almost as if the national philosophy is ‘leave us in peace to fight our own wars’.

For a while the Ethiopians, with undisguised American military support, managed to kick out the extremists who were scattered far and wide, some being picked up whole fleeing to Kenya and elsewhere and handed over to the US for imprisonment without trial under the controversial rendition in Guatanamo Bay.

By the time the UN in 2007 endorsed establishment of an African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional Government with support from Ethiopian troops barely controlled much outside Mogadishu.

Extremist Islamists had regrouped to take control of the countryside.
The token AU troops flown in in March 2007 were largely confined to their camp and the area around the airport, while Ethiopia soldiers supported the fledgling Transitional Government army hold the rest of Mogadishu.

The conflict had also taken a regional dimension as the Islamists had string military support form Ethiopia’s arch-enemy, Eritrea.
For the rest of 2007 and early 2008, Ethiopian forces were coming under increasing attacks from Islamists forces, and doing themselves no good with often brutal reprisals that took a large toll on civilians populations behind whom the irregulars often sheltered.

Occasionally the US would chip in with attacks by sea-based missiles or helicopter gunships on Islamist positions.

But slowly and steadily an a much more extreme successor to the Islamic Courts Union was taking root across Somalia; spawning eventually an al-Shabab that proudly proclaimed its al Qaeda links and other radical Islamist movements all committed to

ousting the Transitional Government and ridding Somalia of foreign occupiers.

This is the deadly battleground President Museveni now want to venture into. It would be entirely in his character to demonstrate that he can hit back hard.

He is in his own estimation the master military strategist whose long bush war led to the exit of the Obote regime.

His troops played a critical role on liberating post-genocide Rwanda and then in marching thousand of miles to kick dictator Mobutu Sese Seko out of the then Zaire.

With that kind of military CV, the conclusion might be that to rid Somalia of extremists with terrorist links will be childs play.
The Americans and Ethiopians might advise otherwise.

There is a big difference between confronting an tired and weary standing army and a highly motivated guerrilla force composed of fighters who welcome martyrdom and who can easily hide within the civilian population.

As the Ethiopians found out not too long ago, sending in the heavy artillery to rout the Islamists is one thing.

Holding on to position and winning the trust and support of the local people is quite another. The present American quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan can provide some telling lessons.

If he basically wants revenge, a quick strike against al-Shabab targets will suffice; but if he wants to eliminate the scourge, President Museveni must be prepared for the long haul.