Naivasha killings planned in State House, says report

A Kikuyu political activist who testified in camera told us that she learned from an aide to Ndura Waruinge, Mungiki national coordinator, that Mungiki was not responsible for all the violence in Naivasha, and that one “could differentiate the Mungiki from the locals, because where Mungiki went, they were not looting, they were just destroying properties. But with the locals, they were looting.”

She further testified that the attacks happened at the same time, around 9am, in the estates of Kayole, Kabati, Kihooto and Karagita, and so she thought the attackers “were dropped at those areas and they had orders (to) start at 9am”, which she characterised “as having the Mungiki type of organisation.”

A former MP
Acting either on NSIS or on its own intelligence, the Naivasha DSIC gathered similar information with regard to a number of politicians and businessmen whom it suspected of financing and organising the gangs they believed to be Mungiki, which were responsible for the Naivasha violence.

Those who the DSIC recommended for arrest for financing and organising the violence included a former MP of the Kikuyu community and other prominent Kikuyu personalities, whose names were provided to the Commission.

Further information in possession of the DSIC was that prior to the attacks, a number of meetings were held at a hotel in Naivasha whose owner was allegedly also involved in the planning and that a former MP from the area was the master mind.

The names of the individuals, who not only purchased the pangas (machetes) from a local supermarket for use by the attackers who had been transported from outside Naivasha, but also directed the attacks on the ground were also made available to the Commission.

The Commission established that response to the PEV in Naivasha by security agencies and district administration reflected the same poor planning and lack of professionalism and independence as was evident in other parts of the Rift Valley Province.

The police were obviously overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence, but breaks in the chain of command and parallel ethnic command structures within the police meant that even with the best of planning, the police were too weak as an institution adequately to respond to the violence in Naivasha.

Persons in danger

The Commission also received ample evidence to the effect that police and administration authorities were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the violence.

The Naivasha DC and OCPD testified that in the morning of January 27 they had to deal with 2 to 3 groups of demonstrators each and that they spent too much time and energy in addressing each group at a time while trying to disperse the crowds and clear road blocks, before moving to the next group of demonstrators.

A community leader who appeared before us in camera and had been personally involved with the police in helping rescue persons in danger, testified as follows:

“Q: Now, may be you need to go back to the date of 27th. What can you recall about that date that is significant for Commissioners?

Witness: There was a lot of violence and I can say, it is like the police were overwhelmed and there was no law in Naivasha on that day and also on 29th.

“The Police were just overwhelmed. Like when I went to the police station trying to get any police officer even to talk, when I got there I talked to the OCPD and then he started getting calls.