Have the Kenyan forces achieved their core mission in Somalia?

On an ordinary Saturday morning on October 15, 2011, journalists gathered at a small boardroom on the fourth floor of Harambee House, the headquarters of the Internal Security ministry.

It was for a press conference addressed by the late Prof George Saitoti and Mr Yusuf Haji, who were then the ministers for Internal Security and Defence respectively, and who appeared to be in a hurry that morning.

“The government has decided to take robust measures to protect and preserve the integrity of the country and the national economy and security,” Prof Saitoti said, reading a statement prepared jointly with Mr Haji. Neither Prof Saitoti nor Mr Haji were very good at expressing themselves that day and few of the reporters, camera crews and photographers appeared to have grasped the magnitude of the announcement. 

But on the floor above, newsroom bosses were getting a better understanding of the matter. Kenya had started a war, General Julius Waweru Karangi told them.

The war was with Al-Shabaab and the intention of Operation Linda Nchi was to push them as far away from the border with Kenya by taking the fight right to their doorstep.

And briefing the editors was the man who would become contemporary Kenya’s war general. A stern General  Karangi told the editors that the government had invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which pronounces self-defence as every state’s inherent right.

Fighting alongside the Kenyan forces was the Ras Kamboni Brigade under the command of Ahmed Mohammed Islam alias General Madoobe and the Somalia National Army..

The Ras Kamboni Brigade and the Somali army were crucial for the Kenyan military in terms of providing intelligence on the location of the enemy and anticipating attacks.

Often, it would be an angry relative in Al-Shabaab who would call their relative in the Somali army or Ras Kamboni Brigade and become the source of information on the next assault.

The taking of Kismayu in September 2012 was proof of the strategy employed by Kenyan military and its Somalia counterparts.

Despite victory on that front, there was a mess back home, where several small attacks were followed in September 2013 by the attack on Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi.

It has also recently become apparent that while military under Amisom continues to hold the port at Kismayu and that Al-Shabaab’s strength has been greatly diminished, the attacks in Kenya have increased, with the highest casualties happening in the attacks at Westgate, Mpeketoni and most recently Garissa.

That has provoked debate on whether the operation explained to senior editors in 2011 has accomplished its goals.