How Kalonzo and Uhuru plotted to stop Raila

On a chilly evening, six men and two women made their way to the boardroom of Uhuru Kenyatta’s private offices at the Chancery Building along Valley road, Nairobi.

It was July 4, 2007. Earlier that day, several top Kenyan leaders had been at the residence of the American Ambassador, Michael Rannenberger, to mark the US Independence Day. Among them were Vice-President Moody Awori, Raila Odinga, and Kalonzo Musyoka. The cream of Kenya’s diplomatic and business community was there, so were US Marines, in their resplendent light khaki uniforms, an absolute show of power in what was, indeed, American territory.

A group of American students from the International School of Kenya was there to sing the National Anthem as the Star Spangled Banner was hoisted high on top of a mast. A sumptuous selection of Kenyan and American delicacies was spread over several tents, including nyama choma, as well as burgers and shish kebabs, to be washed down by frothy beer and choice wines.

That morning, Kalonzo and Uhuru had talked and had agreed to meet to discuss party politics and their own future in the ODM-Kenya. As I made my way out of the envoy’s residence, Kalonzo pulled me aside and told me of the evening’s rendezvous, just at the precise time when Raila and his wife were bidding farewell to the host at the main entrance.

It was to be a secret meeting of the two leaders’ closest aides. No agenda was immediately revealed, but there was a sense of urgency in the way Kalonzo was delivering the invitation. For weeks, since the leaked report that had favoured him against all his other colleagues, Kalonzo had been under siege. His detractors wanted to isolate him; to make him a pariah in ODM-Kenya.

At selective night-time meetings in restaurants —from Palacina in town to Rusty Nail in the Karen suburbs — Kalonzo was the subject of discussion. A strategy was worked out to malign his reputation and to paint him, not like the angel he claimed to be, but as a land grabber who had stolen from the landless.

He was accused of illegally snatching a piece of land in Ukambani that had been allocated to squatters. Of course, he denied the accusations.

The allegations left Kalonzo acutely stressed, and the volleys were not coming from Raila directly but through his hard-core lieutenants and supporters.

The Chancery building is an impressive office-cum-business address, just up the hill from the Nairobi Business District. Directly across the busy street is the huge Nairobi Pentecostal Church, which Kalonzo often used to go to for divine intervention ahead of a major event. On several occasions, he retreated there to seek solace in prayer and peace of mind.

The general area where the Chancery building is located is commonly referred to as the Hill, and although not specifically up-market, it boasts important landmarks, such as the Kenya School of Law, the highly secured Israeli Embassy, and the Integrity Centre, headquarters of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, the original site of the once famous Starlight Night Club.

It is from a suite of upstairs offices at this prestigious address that Kenyatta’s vast empire — of real estate, farming, communication, and tourism — was managed. When President Kenyatta died, the empire was left under the care of his reclusive widow, Mama Ngina, even though it was commonly known that most of decisions were arrived at through family consultations.

After parking my car in the secure basement, I was chaperoned by a security aide through several well-secured doors into Uhuru’s boardroom.

July is usually a cold month by Nairobi standards, and as we drank hot tea to ward off night chills in the well-furnished suite, with Kenyatta’s portrait looking on, it became clear that Raila was the main item of discussion that evening. Kalonzo and Uhuru had agreed to bring to the meeting three officials each.

Kalonzo brought in MPs David Musila, Nyiva Mwendwa, and myself, and Uhuru came with party leaders Dalmas Otieno, Marsden Madoka, and Naomi Shabaan.

The general elections were six months away and nomination wrangles in ODM-Kenya were shearing the party apart. Although Raila and Kalonzo were the leading contenders, the former was leading in opinion polls.

Uhuru, on the other hand, remained an outsider, unhappy about Kanu’s continued association with ODM-Kenya, and had threatened to pull out unless his party was recognised as an independent coalition partner. Kanu and ODM-Kenya had joined ranks two years earlier to oppose the Kilifi Draft at the referendum, and had continued to cooperate against former President Moi’s wishes.

Daggers were drawn that evening at Chancery House. Neither the son of Jomo nor the son of Mairu had kind words for Raila. After all, Raila had masterminded Uhuru’s defeat at the 2002 elections, and he was now frustrating Kalonzo’s quest for the presidency.

Had Raila accepted Moi’s designs and not led a rebellion, Uhuru would probably have become the third President of Kenya. But Raila’s palace coup had halted midstream the political career of the young man, and had embarrassed Moi.

So, it was not surprising that Uhuru was coming out strongly against Raila, accusing him of masterminding a campaign to destroy partner parties by denying them an opportunity to field candidates in elections.

“I am certainly not happy with the kind of treatment Kanu is getting from ODM-Kenya,” Uhuru ranted. “Raila has become uncontrollable and the only way to deal with him is to isolate him.”

That evening I saw Jomo in Uhuru, complete with the former President’s menacing eyes. He was lashing out at Raila, just as his father did to Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Raila’s father) way back in 1969. The only time I saw Uhuru angrier was after his name was linked to the 2007 post-election violence in a report by the KNCHR, in July 2009, which made him labour ardently to exonerate himself.

Uhuru said he had called the meeting to discuss possibilities of forming a powerful movement against what he called Raila’s “dictatorial” ways.

He suggested that the Third Force could initially include himself, Kalonzo, and Julia Ojiambo. Attempts, he added, would also be made to bring in William Ruto, a leading light in the populous Rift Valley region.

“This alliance must be formidable enough to stop Raila, otherwise, this man will give us trouble,” he said.

Uhuru explained that the history behind his party would not allow Kanu to be subservient to any other organisation. “Kanu is the independence party with structures much stronger than any other, with a membership more widespread than LDP’s. We need respect here,” he said angrily.

He also complained that Raila’s men in the Coalition were difficult to negotiate with. “These are not the people I want to conduct business with. We will never agree on anything.” 

The tempo of the meeting had been set, and the first seed towards the collapse of ODM-Kenya had been planted. The abrasive Raila was the target. The question was whether Uhuru, a relatively inexperienced politician, and Kalonzo, “an avowed opponent of democratic reformers and an unwavering proponent of the one-party-state”[1] could call and sustain a bare-knuckled political fight with a hardened former political prisoner, who had waged an aggressive campaign for democracy and human rights in the country.

Were Uhuru and Kalonzo up to the kilter or were they digging their own political graves? Kalonzo, who had more deep-seated and immediate problems with Raila than Uhuru did, felt that Raila was not a team player.

“He is acting like a prefect and treating all of us like children, behaving as if he is already the party’s presidential nominee.”

It would be dangerous, he said, to trust Raila with the leadership of the country. “Can you imagine what Raila will do to all of us? He will step all over the rest of us after he becomes president. We should not allow that to happen.”

Kalonzo said the idea of a Third Force was brilliant, and he promised to bring on board MPs from Ukambani. At the same time, Kalonzo rubbished opinion polls that showed Raila closing in on President Kibaki, leaving him at the bottom of the pile, and warned that unless the trend changed, “we could see this man in State House.”

He also attacked those in the party, whom he did not name, of frustrating his ambition to become president, and pilloried Luo Nyanza MPs who had asked him to drop his bid in favour of Raila. He said those advocating for his surrender had mischievous designs.

“I will be on the ballot box whatever they said,” he assured us.

Dalmas Otieno, a dashingly tall individual, and the only person from Raila’s Luo Nyanza present, joined his colleagues in supporting the idea of a Third Force. A long-standing Kanu loyalist and an intense thinker, Otieno was one of Moi’s top advisers, who had his own strong views about the domination of Nyanza politics by the Odinga clan.

As Raila stormed out of Kanu to join the Rainbow Alliance, Otieno dutifully remained with Moi and Uhuru. He too supported the idea of an alternative movement to take on Raila, but insisted that for such a force to succeed other parties must be brought in, among them the Coast-based Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK), and the Western Kenya-based Kenya African Development and Democracy Union (Kaddu).

Although he did not personally attack Raila, he appeared in no mood to protect the ODM-K leader from the salvos thrown at him by the two leaders. He admitted Raila’s popularity was because of his past sacrifices as a political detainee.

“People identify with him because of the sacrifices he made for this country,” he said, “but that notwithstanding, a properly coordinated grouping should be able to turn tables against him.”

Otieno came out as a truly Kanu stalwart who was willing to stick with the party and Uhuru. The meeting agreed that Musalia Mudavadi, who was closely associated with Raila, would be left out of the proposed scheme for the time being because he could not be trusted.

The meeting resolved that Uhuru would approach Ruto with the idea. Kalonzo would work on Ojiambo, and I would woo the SPK. To start with, we agreed that Uhuru and Kalonzo should make joint appearances, beginning with a breakfast meeting the following week. We felt this would send a message to Raila and his supporters that something powerful was in the offing.

Isolate him

The mood in the room was hostile and both Kalonzo and Uhuru appeared spoilt for a fight. Nevertheless, they knew that Raila would not be easy to wrestle. Their only option was to try to isolate him and make sure he did not get the party’s nomination. By that time, Kalonzo’s popularity had stuck at around 10 per cent and Uhuru had yet to recover from the 2002 defeat.

Because of his earlier association with Moi, whose regime had been blamed for most of the problems in the country, Uhuru’s credibility had suffered a severe blow. His independence had been shattered and his ego bruised. His chances of a comeback in 2007 were virtually nil.

Therefore, the so-called Third Force offered him the perfect vehicle to remain politically relevant while awaiting another presidential attempt in future.

Before Kalonzo and Uhuru could embark on their next move, something interesting happened. Ruto convened a breakfast meeting at his residence in Karen to try to cobble up a power sharing agreement. He had invited Raila, and while Raila was there, he called Kalonzo and invited him to the meeting.

Although Ruto was himself eyeing the presidency, he was at that time working with Kalonzo. Raila, on the other hand, had already made up his mind about going for the big seat, and had started a countrywide tours to popularise his bid.

He had gone to Kisii in Nyanza and then to the Rift Valley. His meetings were well attended and had begun to cause ripples among his colleagues. The success of those meetings most likely got Ruto to seek a power deal.

It took only a few minutes for Kalonzo to drive to Ruto’s palatial home, since his own residence was only a short distance away, in the same locality.

The first thing Kalonzo saw as he drove into the compound was Raila’s car parked on the driveway. There, his worries began. Had he been set up? What could be happening?

As the two adversaries sat opposite each other, Ruto dropped the bombshell that stunned Kalonzo: withdraw your presidential bid and accept the vice-presidency. Let Raila be the flag-bearer, Ruto told Kalonzo.

Ruto himself was prepared to take any other position. Konzo’s mood immediately changed; he was upset, and did not want to encourage further discussion. Telling the two that he wanted time to think about it, he excused himself and left.

From Karen, Kalonzo got in touch with Mudavadi, and the two agreed to consult other MPs on the next course of action. The group met at the Serena Hotel, and thereafter addressed a press conference.

The MPs, among them, Nyiva Mwendwa, Andrew Ligale, Kenneth Marende, Charles Kilonzo, David Mwanzia, and I, faulted Raila for trying to divide the party by holding rallies without involving the others. We suggested that, henceforth, the NEC must agree upon all party meetings and that they must be announced in advance. Raila hit back, saying he would not be held back from talking to Kenyans.

That acrimonious meeting and the events that immediately followed were a turning point in ODM-Kenya. Within no time, new alignments had emerged. Ruto and most of the Kalenjin MPs who were initially for Kalonzo, and Mudavadi and most of the Abaluhyia legislators sided with Raila, while Kalonzo moved away to consolidate an alliance with Uhuru.

On August 6, Uhuru, Kalonzo and Ojiambo appeared publicly for the first time as part of the strategy to intimidate Raila. The event was a meeting with SPK officials at a Nairobi hotel. What made things worse was the fact that the trio remained tight-lipped about what they had discussed with the Coast-based officials.

SPK was formed in 1997 to agitate for federalism and for land rights, but it had failed to make an impact at the national level, meaning its inclusion in the Third Force was not going to have a major impact. Nevertheless, its support was important, from a psychological point of view, to intimidate the enemy. Given the murmurs of disapproval that followed from Raila’s people, the strategy had succeeded.

Kalonzo strategists were pleased with the results and proceeded with plans for another public display of friendship between them. That was accomplished a few weeks later, when Uhuru and Kalonzo went on a road show through the densely populated Mukuru slums on the fringes of Nairobi.

Exuberant crowds lined the dusty thoroughfares as a large convoy of vehicles snaked its way on narrow streets to the soccer field at the centre of the vast estate. The roadshow, in expensive four-wheel vehicles, gave the presidential hopefuls an opportunity to come face to face with abject poverty in one of Kenya’s biggest shanty towns. 

The unemployed and those at the lowest ranks of society inhabited Mukuru. This slum and others provide day labour to firms in the city’s nearby industrial area. The open sewerage system, harbouring millions of flies and dashing rodents; the smoke from nyama choma grills bellowing from shacks; and the stench emanating from pit latrines and open dumpsites, are dominant features throughout this slum area.

For people like Kalonzo and Uhuru, who were used to well-tended gardens and multi-storey mansions, Mukuru turned out to be a reality check. Before addressing the crowd, they donated food and clothing to victims of a recent fire tragedy that had left some residents in the area homeless and hungry.

A large crowd attended and was happy to see the two together.

“What you are seeing today,” Kalonzo told the people, “is the beginning of a lot more appearances between the two of us. When you see me here with Uhuru, you have to figure out yourself what is going on.”

Uhuru cryptically alluded to an upcoming alliance between the two but revealed no details. The Uhuru/Kalonzo/Ojiambo alliance was, however, short-lived.

Shortly thereafter Uhuru convened his party’s NEC meeting and declared that Kanu would pull out of ODM-Kenya and support Kibaki for president. The proposed alliance disappeared into thin air. ODM-Kenya condemned Uhuru’s decision and felt betrayed by a man who, all along, had promised Kanu’s support for the movement.

Underestimated opposition

In arriving at that decision, Uhuru had underestimated the opposition from the rest of his party officials. Secretary General Ruto told Uhuru to stop making “unnecessary demands” on the Coalition.

“Kanu cannot give ultimatums to the party,” Ruto said. “We are not going to be bound by resolutions of Kanu. Uhuru should be bold enough and say I’m out.”[2]

The open confrontation between the two  who had worked closely for years signalled the impending split in Kanu that eventually led many other senior officials to join Raila in ODM-Kenya. Dalmas Otieno, who was Kanu’s Vice-Chairman left in October to join ODM-Kenya, saying his party had made a grave mistake not to see signs of the times.

With Uhuru gone, Kalonzo was left exposed and vulnerable. He was angry that Uhuru had failed to follow through on their alliance arrangement, allowing himself to be pushed around by Ruto. “I am beginning to think Uhuru no longer has control of Kanu,” he privately told aides.

While Uhuru struggled to sort out his own problems, Kalonzo shifted strategy. He realised that his fights with Raila were not earning him any additional support since poll figures were not showing any significant improvement. He grudgingly decided to go along with Raila.

Sometime in September, the ODM-Kenya NEC met and agreed on a timetable for countrywide solidarity rallies. The idea was to reassure people that the party was united—despite internal rifts—and that it was ready and capable of meeting the challenges posed by the upcoming December elections.

Among the first rallies to be scheduled was one at Khadija primary school in Mombasa. The town has a rich cultural history dominated for years by alternating occupation by the Arabs, the Portuguese, and the British.

Fort Jesus, a huge structure overlooking the entrance to the harbour, is a monument from the slave trade years, originally a prison, but was now a museum. Settlements that used to settle freed slaves still existed in neighbouring areas and one of them, Freretown, was only a stone’s throw away from Khadija.

It was here that Kalonzo came face-to-face with angry ODM-Kenya supporters for the first time since the campaigns began, in an incident that almost threw into pieces the fragile relations between the two principal party contenders.

Traitor

The well-attended meeting was buoyant and peaceful at the beginning, but things changed when Kalonzo took the microphone to address the people. Deep in the crowd was a shrill that tore through the crowd like a sharpened blade: “Traitor! You are a traitor.” Then another shouted from a corner, “Go away!”

Those immediately facing the podium flashed out wooden hammers, (a distortion of the Hummer vehicle which Raila had imported into the country only a few weeks earlier), held them high as they shouted insults at the speaker. Others in the clamorous crowd accused Kalonzo of undermining Raila by sticking to a race he knew he could not win, while others asked him to leave the party.

“Why don’t you resign?”

At one point during the confusion, and as he struggled for attention, Kalonzo made the mistake of asking the crowd whether or not he should cut short his speech. The hecklers answered in the affirmative.[3] The noise became so uncontrollable that Kalonzo lost his temper, mumbled something inaudible into the microphone, and descended from the podium with his head down.

All that time, Raila and the other ODM-Kenya leaders sat amusedly. The fracas was brief but the sting was politically lethal for the young lawyer. Whether the goons were hired to cause mayhem and embarrass Kalonzo was at that time beside the point. 

The perception created by that charade was that Kalonzo was untrustworthy and an undeserving of the leadership of the country; that he was more concerned about Raila’s defeat than his own victory.

That evening, Kalonzo complained to his allies that Raila had set him up for the showdown. It emerged later that the heckling was, indeed, planned and that young people were paid to show up at the rally and cause trouble. But the damage to Kalonzo’s image was irreversible.

The Politics of Betrayal: Diaries of a Kenya politician by Joe Khamisi is published by Trafford Publishing (2011).