This the beginning of the end of ANC era

Recent events in South Africa have called into the future of the ruling African National Congress.

Following a cabinet reshuffle in which experienced and competent leaders were replaced by figures loyal to President Jacob Zuma, some of the party’s traditional allies had demanded his resignation.

Along with mounting anti-Zuma protests in urban areas, this has raised questions about the longevity of ANC.

Is it conceivable that a party that previously looked as if it could rule for 50 years be defeated at the ballot box? Or will the government’s liberation legitimacy enable it to reassert control?

Understanding the answer to these questions requires us to take a broader look at the factors that have led to a rise of corruption and clientelistic practices and challenged the notion of South African exceptionalism.

PERSONALISATION OF POWER

Given that elements of the ruling party and the state now appear to be operating on the basis of a more patrimonial model, there is much that can be learnt by drawing comparisons with other African countries in which dominant ruling parties have had to contend with personalisation of power and falling public support.

The experience of nationalist parties that rose to power in the 1960s — such as the Kenya African National Union — is that the biggest threat to continued control is not external opposition, but comes from within.

THE RAINBOW NATION

The notion of South African exceptionalism runs deep. Having suffered white minority rule much longer than most of its counterparts, South Africa experienced one of the most stable and successful transitions to democracy that the continent had ever seen.

When Nelson Mandela’s ANC came to power in 1994, his government promoted tolerance and responsible leadership in the “rainbow nation”.

At that point, South Africa looked like a special case. While Nigeria was blighted by endemic corruption, ANC was led by a man whose reputation was beyond reproach.

When the Zanu-PF government was becoming increasingly brutal in Zimbabwe, Mandela’s administration was promoting the rule of law and inclusion. And just as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Somalia were falling apart, South Africa appeared to be growing stronger.

Moreover, the notion of South African exceptionalism was not just something dreamt up by academics or reporters: it was deeply felt by South Africans themselves.

NATIONAL IDENTITY
This had positive consequences, most notably by supporting the reconstruction of a broader national identity.

However, it also had its downside. A report into the 2008 xenophobic violence by South Africans against migrants from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe in Johannesburg concluded that in addition to urban deprivation and intense competition for jobs and housing, a popular understanding of “exclusive citizenship” motivated anti-foreigner sentiment.

The violence and the economic conditions that gave rise to it, were a clue — for those who had their eyes open — that South Africa was not as exceptional as was sometimes implied.

On the one hand, a number of other such as Ghana and Mauritius were also doing well when it came to consolidating democracy – it was just that these positive stories tended to be ignored while some aspects of the South African “miracle” did not stand up to closer scrutiny.

PERSONALISING POLITICS

While the country recorded impressive achievements in terms of its progressive Constitution and growing welfare state, many parts of the bureaucracy were prone to rent-seeking behaviour, and this continued after the transition to majority rule.

Similarly, despite its proud history and impressive first four years in office, ANC was already exhibiting patrimonial tendencies before Zuma became president in 2009.

As Tom Lodge has argued, many of those who rose to prominence in the movement during apartheid had been born into privileged positions, while ANC was forced to develop ties to criminal networks in order to operate after it was banned and forced into exile.

During the liberation struggle, the imperative of fighting the apartheid regime kept these patrimonial tendencies and criminal connections in check. Afterwards, they started to become more pronounced.
These tendencies were then exacerbated by Zuma’s rise to power.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Lacking the management skill to lead by example, and more comfortable with a form of politics based on personal relationships, he set about entrenching himself in power by promoting loyalists, condoning corruption and sacrificing policy for patronage. As a result, ANC’S patrimonial tendencies went into overdrive.

In addition to major corruption scandals over the upgrade to his Nkandla home and a multi-billion dollar arms deal, the president has drawn fire for his close relationship to the Gupta family – allegedly allowing them to influence major policy decisions in return for financial support.

More recently, the president plunged the party into a full-blown crisis by removing many of the most competent members of the cabinet and replacing them with loyalists. As a result, South Africa’s credit rating has been downgraded to junk.

CONTAINING CLIENTELISM

For many, this was the straw that broke the camel’s back. In the days that followed, a number of prominent political figures and the ANC’s partners in the triple alliance — the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions — called on the president to go.

Putting this process in historical context is important because it makes it clear that while Zuma has been a disaster, it would be naïve to think that he is the sole source of ANC’s problems – or that his removal will solve them.

It also demonstrates that while South Africa may feature a comparatively strong state and independent judiciary, in some respects, it faces similar problems to many other African countries.

One small silver lining to this cloud is that we can use the experience of other states to better understand the prospects for South Africa.

One thing we know from countries like Kenya and Nigeria is that when a form of politics based on personal networks and clientelism is set up at the heart of government, it can become embedded.

When this happens, it is not enough to change the president – meaningful reform requires the removal or retraining of an entire tranche of figures put in place during their tenure. Otherwise, patterns of patronage and clientelism have a way of reproducing themselves over time.

LEAD TO DEFEAT
The lesson from other African countries for South Africa is, therefore, a worrying one: it is a long way back. But this comparison should not lead to defeat, because there are a number of ways in which the country remains distinctive.

Civil society remains more robust and independent than in many other states. Similarly, ANC has more internal checks and balances than most governments, and some formal rules continue to be effectively implemented.

These features did not prevent the slide towards patrimonialism, and on their own they will not topple Zuma, but they are the foundations on which the struggle for a new South Africa can be fought.
What about the future of Zuma and ANC? Some commentators are predicting that the ruling party will suffer in future elections. We have already seen ANC defeated in local polls in Johannesburg, Pretoria and other urban centres. Is this the prelude to more damaging defeats at the provincial and national level in elections scheduled for 2019?

Much will depend on whether Zuma is willing to relinquish his hold on the party. If he is, it is conceivable that an ANC under new and reformist leadership could recapture the public imagination.

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

If he is not willing to put the party’s interest first, its reputation will continue to suffer, while internal disputes within the government will become increasingly heated and personal.

This is significant because a second important lesson from the continent’s former nationalist parties is that the main danger to liberation movements comes not from outside but within. Much like the ANC, parties such as Kanu faced relatively few external challenges, having dominated late colonial and early independence elections.

However, while they faced few effective electoral rivalries — and none after the construction of one-party states in the 1970s and 1980s — they were continually vulnerable to defections from within.

Kanu represents a perfect example of this tendency. Having governed since independence, the party was ultimately defeated not to a new social or liberation movement, but rather as a result of a series of defections.

The National Rainbow Coalition that removed Kanu from power in 2002 was headed by Mwai Kibaki, a former vice president under Kanu, and featured a number of prominent leaders who had split from the government because they disagreed with the outcome of the battle to replace President Moi.

The lesson for the ANC is clear: the greatest danger facing the government is that a faction of disgruntled leaders will quit the party in protest at Zuma’s leadership, boosting the numbers, legitimacy, and cohesion of the opposition. The outcome of the 2019 elections, then, will depend as much on how ANC deals with its own internal problems as the way in which it manages the protests on the streets.

Cheeseman is the professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham @fromagehomme