Chaotic primaries a call for action to avert risk of violence

The just-concluded anarchic nominations come as a wake-up call for concerted action to avert the risk of violence during the August 8 General Election.

With the August polls fast approaching, it is déjà vu all over again.

Locally and internationally, pundits are fretting a repeat of the tragic ethnic violence that engulfed Kenya after the disputed presidential election result in December 2007.

Since 1991, when Kenya returned to pluralist politics, the country has reeled under a low-intensity conflict within and between parties occurring at the local and national levels.

Invariably, Kenya’s low-intensity conflict has tended to escalate into deadly cycles of violence during election seasons.

EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE

Except in 2002 and 2013 when violence only occurred sporadically in few counties, the country experienced violence before and after the general elections in 1991-93, 1997-1998 and 2007-2008.

Kenya’s 2010 democratic constitution was mooted as a framework to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and grievances that set off the 2007-2008 crisis.

But Kenya’s low-intensity conflict continues to cast a long shadow over the coming elections.

Two narratives are competing to influence policy and interventions to mitigate possible violence.

One narrative is largely Lockean, depicting Kenya as a stable and model democratic state at peace with itself and its neighbours, a regional economic hub presiding over Africa’s 4th largest economy and a strategic partner in mediating regional conflicts and in the global fight against terrorism.

ETHNIC EXCLUSION

The other narrative is Hobbesian, portraying the country as inescapably destined to burn if the Jubilee Government is re-elected and citing ethnic exclusion, corruption, wastage of public resources, social inequalities, high levels of poverty and alleged human rights violations (extra-judicial killings) as harbingers of the “coming anarchy”.

Beyond this polarity, Kenya is a perfect case of the proverbial Tale of Two Cities. From the politics of Kanu-versus-Kadu and Kanu-versus KPU in the 1960s, the country’s politics revolves around the axis of political tribalism.

After 1991, Kanu’s divide-and-rule strategy to counter the burgeoning opposition intensified ethnic balkanisation and mobilisation of political parties along tribal identities and fault-lines.

However, accords and discords in the run-up to and in the aftermath of elections reflect the reality that Kenya is a country of ethnic minorities. No single Kenyan group can win an election banking on its own numbers.

POLITICAL FORMATIONS

Consequently, Kenyan politics has morphed into a game of horse-trading by the kingpins of Kenya’s “Big Five” ethnic groups – the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba.

However, victory or defeat have depended on the ability of political formations to win the support of the middle and lower tier groups, including the Meru, Kisii and other Kenyan communities in the swing areas in Western, the Rift Valley, Coast and Northern Kenya.

It is now official. The 2017 General Election will be a two-horse race between two rival multi-ethnic formations: The ruling Jubilee Party of President Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto and the National Super Alliance (NASA) which has unveiled its line-up with Raila Odinga as its presidential flagbearer.

Anarchy and violence in party primaries highlighted the complexities and significance of political dynamics in the strongholds of the main parties.

It is safe to aver that elections of governors, senators, Members of the National Assembly, women representatives and MCAs in these zones are over and done with.

PREVENT CONFLICT

As such, efforts to prevent conflict should now shift to pastoral and multi-ethnic counties.

Although the 2013 election was judged as peaceful at the presidential level, deadly communal violence in the run-up to and after the election occurred in Tana River, Marsabit and Mandera counties, collectively killing no less than 500 people and displacing nearly 70,000 others.

Fierce competition for newly discovered mineral resources has already set the stage for conflict in counties like Turkana where locals have been involved in a row with Tullow oil firm over claims of bias in hiring practices.

Violence risks recurring in Kenya’s volatile counties where drought in 2016-2017 has fuelled cattle rustling, banditry and inter-ethnic conflicts in Laikipia and Baringo.

In April 2016, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission identified 19 potential hotspots of possible election violence in 2017.

REDUCE THREAT

NCIC has since increased the tally to 33 counties, more than two-thirds of Kenya’s 47 counties.

On the road to August, Kenya and the international community should step up support to mitigate the effects of drought and reduce the threat of violent conflict.

Since the deadly terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall, Kenya has undertaken far-reaching security sector reforms, which has greatly enhanced the capacity of law enforcement and security agencies to coordinate their operations to detect and deter violence.

An intelligence-led approach to security has ended the era of “oligopoly of violence” where private militias, vigilantes, bandits, warlords and criminal gangs dominated the “security market” as alternative producers and wielders of violence.

It was the diffusion of violence that progressively eroded the legitimate monopoly of the state over the means of physical coercion and undermining its ability to prevent the 2008 post-election violence.

COMBATING VIOLENCE

In the run-up to 2017, focus should be on building the capacity of the state to strictly operate within a human rights framework while combating election-related violence.

This demands arresting and committing offenders to trial.

Bolstering the capacity of NCIC to combat reckless populist rhetoric and hate speech, especially in social media platforms, and encouraging parties to commit themselves to non-violent and peaceful elections are critical steps to securing peaceful elections.

More critically, Kenya and its external partners should invest in enhancing the public trust in the IEBC to oversee credible, free and fair elections.

Prof Kagwanja is the Chief Executive of Africa Policy Institute.

This article is an excerpt of remarks made during the meeting on: “Preventing Violence in Kenya’s 2017 General Election” jointly organised by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies and the US State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilisation Operations in Washington on April 28.