Graft accusations against Uhuru are way off the mark

An easy, if indirect, way to see the problem with Paul Mwangi’s recent argument that President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government is bound to be corrupt is to consider the advice often given by well-meaning liberals to Kenya, and other developing countries, under the Washington Consensus.

We were strongly advised to behave as idealised versions of developed countries did. These countries opened their markets to free trade, removed tariffs, let money and goods move across borders. The example was clear; our emulation was expected when it was not enforced.

No great insight was required to spot the fallacy: even if it were true that developed countries had observed every article of the free-trade catechism in the past, the institutional and technological arrangements in the past were different.

A century ago, it was far harder to move goods, services and money quickly around the world than it is now. A century ago, completely free trade was far less likely to destroy infant industries in developing countries than it is now.

Mwangi’s argument is an object lesson in the costs of ignoring institutional context. He argues that because President Kenyatta and President Mwai Kibaki came to power under similar policy and political circumstances, President Kenyatta’s efforts against corruption will fail, as President Kibaki’s did. His reasoning wholly ignores changes in institutional context; in any case, his premise is false.

President Kibaki came to power under the old constitution, which allowed the President substantial powers of appointment and patronage.

SUBSTANTIAL CHECKS

This is no longer the case. The new constitutional framework divides and distributes power widely. For the first time, the President has substantial checks on his powers, particularly of appointment and hence patronage – the key mechanism by which corruption in Kenya works.

Perhaps the clearest example of the increased scrutiny of the President is the new administration’s adherence to decisions of the courts in the matter of appointments. No other president has faced such public legal pressure to justify his choice of appointees.

That difference, on its own, explains why Mwangi’s assumption that policies similar to President Kibaki’s would lead to results similar to President Kibaki’s is false: the institutional landscape has been altered.

The second point, which also puts paid to the argument that the political context and policy is the same, begins by noticing the difference in the way Kibaki and Uhuru came to power. President Kibaki came to power as head of a loose coalition, rapidly cobbled together before the election.

The wrangles over the MoU that ensued early in his reign were symptomatic of the President’s difficulty in controlling his parliamentary party. Those facts make conceivable Mwangi’s claim that early in Kibaki’s reign, the forces of corruption ganged together to force a motion of no confidence in his government.

The situation is radically different where President Kenyatta’s government is concerned. He and William Ruto came to power as part of a coalition formed long before the elections. Both wings of that coalition already had substantial control of their electorates before the coalition formed.

Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto were better placed to determine who won the elections on a Jubilee ticket in 2013 than Mr Kibaki had over NARC candidates in 2002.

That gives them a stronger governing consensus, even at the start of their term, than Kibaki had in 2002. Uhuru and Ruto don’t need, after election, to gain control of the National Assembly.

Finally, Mwangi argues that the fight against corruption should not be petty – in fighting corruption, the President should not listen to rumour mongers.

Remember that one of his complaints against President Kibaki was that he did not listen to petty tales of corruption. Mwangi takes this as evidence that Kibaki condoned corruption.

Indeed, reflection on Kenya’s experience with corruption suggests that the entire framing of Mwangi’s argument is mistaken.

John Githongo’s laudable work at the heart of government revealed serious failures, but once he left, no institution remained behind to continue his investigations. As our constitution recognises, people, however laudable their efforts, are a distant second to institutions when it comes to beating corruption.

Naisula Lesuuda and Joy Adhiambo Gwendo are senators.