Kapedo’s tragedy is an embodiment of its official neglect

What you need to know:

  • Local sources, however, indicate that individual murders since March, apparently along ethnic lines, including of a patient at the Kapedo hospital, have been met with official inertia and even partisanship, forcing locals to take matters into their own hands, culminating in an incident in October where three security officers were killed.
  • While the attack on the police took place in Kapedo, the military operation has targeted a much bigger geographical area as evidenced by the far-flung sources of complaints against the military operation, with some of them as far as 100km away.
  • The brief appearance by the President in the wake of the Kapedo attack, who was only interested in the killing of his armed forces, even ignoring the 10 Kenya Police Reservists allegedly killed in the area, reinforces this approach.

Allegations have emerged, including in the media, that the military is pursuing a scorched earth policy against the local population in the expedition into Kapedo.

Sources in Kapedo allege that soldiers indiscriminately looted shops at Chemolingot, the Tiaty sub-district headquarters, and that Tangulbei, about 100km from Kapedo, was also looted and burnt down a few days later.

It is alleged, further, that a number of donkeys and camels were killed at Chesakam, about 10km from Kapedo, and that there was the deliberate damage of a borehole, the sole source of water, at Riong’o, 60km from Kapedo.

It is also claimed that 60 goats were shot dead at Chemsik, 70 cows and some camels by the roadside at Chesakam, and that attacks at Chepkalacha, near Lake Baringo, also targeted livestock.

The killing of livestock was a feature of the military operations in the North Eastern Province during the Shifta era.

The military has denied these claims, the same thing it did when allegations of wrongdoing were made about looting at the Westgate attack, where independent evidence, including video footage, contradicted the denial.

In the media, Kapedo has been presented as an act of incomprehensible madness, unconnected with anything else.

Local sources, however, indicate that individual murders since March, apparently along ethnic lines, including of a patient at the Kapedo hospital, have been met with official inertia and even partisanship, forcing locals to take matters into their own hands, culminating in an incident in October where three security officers were killed.

In retaliation, a few days before the Kapedo attack, nine people were allegedly killed at Sola, and the only local school at Chesitet was burnt down.

REVENGE KILLINGS

The killing of 19 officers at Kapedo has been explained as only the latest in the series of revenge killings between locals and the security officers.

There are questions about the legality of using the military in Tiaty. A notice signed by Defence Secretary Raychelle Omamo, dated November 4, refers to a resolution of the National Assembly passed on December 5, last year, as forming the legal basis for deploying the military. The resolution in question, of course, predates the occurrences at Kapedo to which it cannot logically apply.

It seems that the government is presenting the old parliamentary resolution as providing a general authority for military intervention in all future situations, an interpretation that undermines the reason for seeking authorisation in the first place.

Secondly, last week’s notice refers to Turkana and West Pokot while Kapedo is in Baringo and, therefore, not covered by the alleged authority.

While the attack on the police took place in Kapedo, the military operation has targeted a much bigger geographical area as evidenced by the far-flung sources of complaints against the military operation, with some of them as far as 100km away.

This lends credence to claims of an indiscriminate approach by the military, and has given rise to feelings by the Pokot that the Kapedo attack has provided an excuse to pursue objectives that are unconnected with security concerns.

Further, the allegations about unmet expectations as to justice suggest that the military incursion, much criticised on other grounds, is a wrong response for the people of Tiaty.

The regrettable Kapedo attack reflects the tragic consequences of official neglect in that part of the country. In response to perennial insecurity in the area, the government erected a General Service Unit (GSU) camp at Kapedo, thus simplifying the problem as only needing the strong-arm presence of the GSU.

However, the GSU has often been sucked into the periodic sectional fighting, in which it is viewed as partisan.

NO PLAN FOR JUSTICE

As reflected by the allegations of failure to investigate previous killings in Kapedo, the government has no plan for, or response to, the local justice issues. The brief appearance by the President in the wake of the Kapedo attack, who was only interested in the killing of his armed forces, even ignoring the 10 Kenya Police Reservists allegedly killed in the area, reinforces this approach.

In the eyes of the government, the local population consists of primordial people who kill without a reason and against whom the only proper response is superior violence.

Of course, there exist many counter-narratives against the Pokot people, especially from the neighbouring Turkana, Tugen, Ilchamus, and Samburu, none of which detracts from the assertion that what the Pokot, and these neighbours, need are schools, roads, water, hospitals, the things that affirm human dignity, and not military garrisons. Until these are provided, no military force will be sufficient to end the pervasive insecurity in the area.

As now confirmed by Kapedo, the militarisation of the country, since the Westgate attack, is set to continue.

Having tasted new power through its involvement in civilian affairs, the genie is out of the bottle, and the military will keep insisting that it is the best placed institution to handle security situations as they arise.

Having covered up its misconduct in Westgate, the military cannot now credibly deflect claims of misconduct anywhere, even when such claims are unmerited. The covering up of the Westgate misconduct is proving a long-term mistake for the military.

Deploying the military, previously a force of last resort, assumes that it will succeed where police have failed.

The alleged scorched earth approach is a consequence of the pressure created by this assumption.

If the cloud of misconduct at Westgate liberated the military from the strictures into which its long-standing image of integrity had bound it, the pressure to perform better than the police will drive our soldiers down the terrain of excessive force, of the kind alleged in Kapedo.