Kenya and region stand to gain from South African new interests

Before South African President Jacob Zuma visited Kenya last week, expectations were high that a deal allowing freer travel would be struck.

The expectations were dashed when President Zuma dithered, only pledging that matters immigration was a work in progress. Kenya’s visa interests were not a completely lost cause as the joint communique captured South African “concessions” offering easier visa terms for elite categories of Kenyans.

It, however, fell short of reciprocal balance given South Africans enjoy a visa-on-arrival regime while Kenyans endure steep hurdles in travelling to South Africa.

The reason President Zuma gave for the equivocation is that terrorists and criminals would exploit the opportunity to gain entry into South Africa and wreak havoc there. In essence, law abiding Kenyans are collateral damage.

This justification can be given benefit of doubt considering the reality of terrorists in Kenya. Incredulity can, however, be entertained.

An important factor that might have impelled South Africa to prevaricate is that the country has policies and regulations focused on checking the influx of African economic refugees. Kenya is no exception.

Allowing Kenyans no-holds-barred entry would have been received negatively by South African interest groups that have often expressed angst at other Africans, especially of lower classes. It would also have had a domino effect with other African countries pushing for similar deals.  

It is noteworthy that President Uhuru Kenyatta lobbied his counterpart on the visa issue at an open press briefing. It would appear that President Kenyatta was showing his being in sync with Kenyans’ interests.

However, far from retaliating, the Kenyan side proceeded to sign an agreement in favour of Kenyan diplomatic passport holders and better visa terms for elite businesspersons. This is an indication that the two countries are reading from the same script on issues considered of mutual benefit.

The understanding is that general visa issues should not be a stumbling block. The upshot is that the issues of imbalance in visa issuance will be pushed to back the burner for the foreseeable future.

The fact trade issues dominated the discussions with the Kenya-South Africa business forum as the highlight indicates the core and immediate interest was South Africa’s intent on shoring up its flagging economy.

The South African Gross Domestic Product growth rate has been hovering in the one per cent and negative growth territory for months. South Africa sought to secure a favourable environment for her 60-plus companies based in Kenya, while local business lobbies — the Kenya Private Sector Alliance and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers — sought more favourable terms for accessing the South African market.

If agreements on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers are upheld, it can be expected that Kenyan-based South African companies will extend their footprint and new entrants will set up shop.  

The visit served to reset and elevate Kenya-South Africa relations after years of unease by the two African regional powers. It instituted a comprehensive approach as memoranda were signed in six fields in one fell swoop unlike the past when deals were negotiated piecemeal.

The centrepiece of the newfound diplomatic camaraderie is a “Special Status Agreement” in which a “Bi-National Commission” will be established. It is a defining accord that Kenya’s ministry of Foreign Affairs and South African equivalent, the Department of International Cooperation, will be working on in the coming days.

Besides symbolising elevated diplomatic relations, the bi-national commission will create a stable framework to serve as a coordination mechanism.

In the South African foreign policy architecture, a bi-national commission is code for comprehensive strategic partnership, a status bestowed on countries with which the country enjoys extensive political, economic and cultural interests.

The agreement paving way for South Africa’s investment in the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (Lapsset) Corridor project is of significance on multiple fronts. It is instructive the deal was signed by South Africa’s ministry of Public Enterprise.

This suggests that South African state corporations in the ministry will be angling for a bite of the Lapsset pie. Of particular interest are Transnet (freight and logistics services via rail, ports management and pipeline) and Eskom, the power utility corporation, both of which fit in Lapsset’s transport and energy infrastructure priorities.

SECURE LAPSSET DEALS

South African multinationals with a track record in international infrastructure contracting would also be looking to ride on the agreement to secure Lapsset deals. Geopolitical factors can also be deduced from the deal.

South Africa’s entry into the Lapsset arithmetic is likely to intensify competition for aspects of the project with countries such as China, Japan and United States that already have indicative or tangible involvement. Besides, South Africa’s investment in Lapsset potentially plugs it into the rest of the region given that the project’s linkages with Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Kenyan leaders would welcome South Africa’s investment because it not only serves to attract other powerful global investors but also serves as endorsement for a project.    

The agreements for cooperation by the two countries’ military and police entities were largely expected. In more respects than one, the entente in military and police spheres have diplomatic, economic and geopolitical implications.

It can be anticipated that joint efforts in pacifying turmoil in places such as South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi will get fresh impetus.

Both countries have an interest in regional tranquillity so as to advance their economic interests. Incidentally, the Lapsset project is faced with challenges because of location next to war-torn and terrorist infested Somalia while the consequence of the instability in South Sudan is the proliferation of small arms into northern Kenya.

South Sudan’s instability also militates against robust involvement of the oil-rich nation in Lapsset. The possibility of Kenya acquiring military equipment from South African manufacturers such as the state-owned Denel can also be factored into the security dimension of the visit.

President Kenyatta and President Zuma were in concurrence with regard to the reformation of the UN system. This is often seen as a euphemism for a campaign for a permanent seat for Africa in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) besides other issues of poor African representation in agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Hedging by the five UNSC veto powers (US, China, Russia, UK and France) remains a challenge in these respects. However, the other impediment has been the rivalry between three key African hegemons – South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt.

The fact that reforms to the UN system featured in the joint communique implies that South Africa may call on Kenya’s support vis a vis Nigeria and Egypt should the long-anticipated African representation in the UNSC come up.

Quid pro quo would demand South Africa supports Kenya’s geopolitical interests. A case in point is Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed’s campaign for the African Union Commission chairperson position.

President Kenyatta was reported lobbying South Africa’s support. However, there is no indication of South Africa’s explicit support for Ms Mohamed. Is South Africa uncomfortable with coming out openly through its influential weight behind Ms Mohamed’s bid?    

The writer is a postdoctoral fellow at University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa