Let’s redefine this unusual war with Al-Shabaab

President Uhuru Kenyatta inspects a guard of honor during the Kenya Defence Forces Day celebrations at 3KR in Lanet, Nakuru on October 14, 2014. PHOTO | SULEIMAN MBATIAH | NATION MEDIA GROUP

What you need to know:

  • I said that in 1979, before Dar-es-Salaam invaded Uganda to oust its military dictatorship, all Tanzanians knew why the coming war was just and theirs to lose.
  • KDF crossed into Somalia to stop Al-Shabaab raiding Kenya’s coastal tourism assets, abducting and killing visitors and Kenyans and, therefore, strangulating tourism, which is Nairobi’s goose that lays the golden egg.
  • This war has no fronts; the enemy is not a conventional army and the combatants have no regard for global conventions governing warfare, human life or rights.

For the umpteenth time, we have been reminded that Kenya is at war.

We are usually so reminded when the country is hit hard by terrorists as was the case last year in Mandera (twice), Lamu (twice) and, of course, Westgate in Nairobi in 2013.

Yes, we were hit hard in Garissa and reminded — by terrorists and government — that Kenya is at war. Before then we were told we were at war in the lead up to last December 18, and on that day, because the government sought to introduce legislation to fight terrorism.

When in October 2011 we woke up to the news that the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) had crossed into — not invaded — Somalia, I argued that the troops should have invaded only after a serious campaign of educating and preparing the public for the impending war.

I wrote that Kenyans needed to know why the war was necessary, so as to own it.

I said that in 1979, before Dar-es-Salaam invaded Uganda to oust its military dictatorship, all Tanzanians knew why the coming war was just and theirs to lose.

An angry minister sent me a text message dismissing my views and column as irrelevant. Now, is it relevant for Kenyans to know, for example, that KDF is part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom)? Yes.

AL-SHABAAB RAIDS

Should Kenyans, therefore, be told what this means in terms of command and objectives? Yes, because Amisom has a command structure into which KDF must fit and operate. This has a bearing on the war against Al-Shabaab.

KDF crossed into Somalia to stop Al-Shabaab raiding Kenya’s coastal tourism assets, abducting and killing visitors and Kenyans and, therefore, strangulating tourism, which is Nairobi’s goose that lays the golden egg.

Kenya did not, therefore, provoke war with Al-Shabaab, but moved into its Somalia base to establish a buffer between the terrorists and Kenya’s border. Al-Shabaab was the aggressor. KDF went into Somalia because Kenya needed to defend itself. Three questions then arise: One, does KDF’s mission of protecting Kenya’s territory, people and economic assets dovetail with Amisom’s? No, because the two missions are not the same. This needs to be made clear because Amisom exists to stabilise lawless Somalia.

Two, can it ever be the case that KDF’s presence in Somalia is what precipitates Al-Shabaab attacks and massacres of innocents? No. This bears repeating: Al-Shabaab attacked Kenya and therefore courted KDF’s defensive invasion. Last, does Al-Shabaab govern Somalia? No, it is not a government; it is a terror group, waging an asymmetrical war on Kenya.

And this is why this war needs to be defined for Kenyans to know it is unusual, against an unusual enemy and fought in unusual theatres.

This war has no fronts; the enemy is not a conventional army and the combatants have no regard for global conventions governing warfare, human life or rights. Government should decide whether these militants are ordinary offenders. Should they be remanded among regular criminals? Should they be treated in accordance with recognised warfare conventions? Or, should they be branded, as did the George W. Bush administration, illegal combatants?

END NOT ON THE HORIZON

Yes, Al-Shabaab must be treated differently even as, alas, young and educated Kenyans join it and add to the chaos. Does this war have an end? That is not on the horizon. Though Al-Shabaab provoked Kenya’s invasion, now that KDF is part of Amisom it is not clear when its job will be done. And, there is no guarantee KDF’s return will end terrorist attacks on Kenya.

Because it is unique, this war must be uniquely fought. So, what should government do differently? One, create a new agency to specifically attune to fight terrorism. Police will not clash with the military nor different ministers issue conflicting statements about the same thing. Responsibility, structure and chain of command will be streamlined.

Two, this calls for a new national security strategy centred on, one, KDF exiting Somalia and, two, preventing Al-Shabaab — and sundry enemies — from operating on Kenyan soil.

Three, people support their government when it is open to them and rallies them to a cause. Aggrieved people look to government for comfort and direction. Similarly, when internal or external forces threaten the government, its insurance policy is the people’s support. Therefore, Kenyans must be told what they are confronted with, what their government is doing and what it expects of them.

Therefore, the government must initiate and sustain education of Kenyans on the war on terrorism.

Opanga is a media consultant; [email protected]