National security re-positioned as driver of foreign policy
What you need to know:
- Onwards: Globally, the attack has propelled counter-terrorism back as a central tenet of the policies of key powers towards Kenya
The deadly terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall that left 69 people dead and nearly 200 others injured has emphatically changed Kenya’s diplomatic fortunes, thinking and praxis.
Arguably, the grisly terror is likely to have almost the same seismic impact on Kenya’s foreign policy as the events of 9/11 exerted on America’s foreign policy. Significantly, the attack has firmly re-positioned national security as the fulcrum of the country’s assertive pan-African foreign policy.
Globally, the attack has shocked the conscience of the world, propelling counter-terrorism back as a central tenet of the policies of key powers towards Kenya. The icy relations between the West and the Government of President Uhuru Kenyatta over the trial of Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court also seems to be thawing.
Westgate is markedly different from earlier bouts of terrorism in Kenya. One of these is the bombing of the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi that killed 20 people and injured 80 others on the New Year’s Eve in 1980.
An Arab group that claimed responsibility said this was a retaliation against Kenya’s decision to allow the C-130 Hercules transport planes carrying Israeli commandos to refuel in Nairobi during the July 1976 raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda to rescue hostages from a hijacked aircraft.
The second is the August 7, 1998 simultaneous bombing of the United States embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, where a total of 223 people were killed and an estimated 4,000 others wounded. Kenya was not a principle target but “collateral damage”.
The same is true of the November 28, 2002 terrorists attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, which claimed 13 lives and injured 80. Almost simultaneously, terrorists also fired two shoulder-launched Strela 2 (SA-7) surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli chartered Boeing 757 airliner at Moi International Airport.
The Westgate incident is the first major terrorist attack targeting Kenya as a country. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Al-Shabaab’s operative, Sheikh Abu Muscab, said the Westgate attack was a retaliation for Kenyan troops entering Somalia in the wake of Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011.
The Westgate attack points to a dramatic comeback of al-Shabaab as a home-grown jihad movement. Despite the air of triumphalism that greeted Kenya’s capture of al- Shabaab’s stronghold of Kismayu in September 2012, the group was not vanquished. Its approximately 5,000-strong force and secret service — Amniyat — remain intact, unified under a new supremo, Ahmed Godane.
Emboldening al-Shabaab is strained relations between Nairobi and the Somali Federal Government (SFG). Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud condemned the killings, pledging to “stand shoulder to shoulder with Kenya”.
However, radical elements in his government have accused Kenya of taking sides and of being reluctant to turn over Kismayu to the government, preferring to pass it on to a friendly leadership in Jubaland.
The call by Somali Government militants for the withdrawal of KDF from southern Somalia has eerie echoes in al-Shabaab’s position. Al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, has warned that:
“If you want Kenya in peace, it will not happen as long as your boys are in our lands.” This is feeding the ubiquitous theory that Mogadishu’s top leadership is covertly abetting the al-Shabaab terror.
The mass shooting at Westgate comes as a shocking reminder to the world that it is not business as usual. Kenya is a country at war. Since October 2011, its security forces have been embroiled in an intricate asymmetrical war against the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab group.
In the 2011/2012 period, the group launched at least 17 attacks in Kenya, killing at least 48 people and injuring around 200 more. Further, the Westgate shooting is just the latest in a series of retaliatory measures by al-Shabaab against its perceived enemies, including a raid against a United Nations compound in Mogadishu in June.
As such, al-Shabaab’s terrorism has a global context and logic. It chose the mall as a target because it is a major hub of Westerners. As a result, in addition to numerous Kenyans who died in the attack, at least 18 foreigners of different nationalities were also killed. Moreover, its fighters during the attack were from different nationalities. “We are fighting global terrorism here,” quipped KDF chief General Julius Karangi.
After the Westgate attack, foreign policy scholars in the West are urging their governments to rethink their approaches to counter-terrorism with Kenya emerging as the epicentre of the security debate.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent a message of solidarity and spoke with Mr Kenyatta. The United Nations Security Council condemned the attack “in the strongest possible terms”.
And the European Union offered “its full support to the Kenyan authorities in dealing with the situation.” Individual countries like Britain, France and America also condemned the attack.
Tellingly, the ICC excused Deputy President William Ruto from trials for a week to deal with the mall hostage crisis. And ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda pledged to “work with the Kenyan government” to ensure that those behind the attack are brought to book.
It is not clear whether this “solidarity” is going to translate into a way out of the ICC issue conundrum. But, certainly, Kenya will prioritise the security of its people above everything else.
Prof Peter Kagwanja is the Chief Executive of the Africa Policy Institute and former Government Adviser. [email protected]
