Operation Linda Nchi failed; let military return

The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) informed us that the Al-Shabaab militants who executed 28 Kenyans in cold blood inside Kenya’s borders planned their raid at a camp in Somalia, some 21 kilometres away from the common border.

Further, Kenya Defence Forces said, Al-Shabaab had another camp some 45 kilometres inside Somalia.

But, said the military, this part of Somalia in which these two camps were, falls under the supervision of Ethiopia and not Kenya. Therefore, it implied, it could not have taken out these facilities in its on-going war against Al-Shabaab because this mandate rightly belongs to Addis Ababa.

The military also said it killed 100 militants the same day they massacred Kenyans after it launched an aerial pursuit into enemy territory. It is important to note that KDF’s statement was aired not long after Deputy President William Ruto mumbled and fumbled at his own news conference on the massacre in Mandera.

The Presidency and military, therefore, agreed and confirmed that Kenya’s action was retaliatory but successfully obliterated the camps and killed the militants in one fell swoop. Of course, it goes without saying that the Presidency and military were lauding their actions as heroic, patriotic and in defence of Kenyans and Kenya.

But there is a little local difficulty. Terrorist camps 21kms or 45kms away from any of Kenya’s borders pose a serious threat to the country’s security. Therefore, Nairobi should have done one of three things: Act unilaterally and destroy them; rope in Addis and together demolish the camps; or, ask Amisom and the UN for permission to obliterate the camps.

The foregoing, as the massacre of Mandera sadly proves, did not happen. So what was the alternative cause of action for Nairobi given that it is at war with Al-Shabaab and that the terrorists never tire of warning that there will be no peace inside Kenya as long as KDF remain in Somalia?

In my view, and I stand corrected, those camps should have been kept under 24-hour surveillance by all-seeing, all-hearing, all-smelling and all-feeling human and hi-tech assets. No persons, or beasts even, should have left either camp without their scent, sound or breath even, being detected this side of the border and where war would be waiting for them.

Of course, good people, neither military nor police radar picked up the armed Al-Shabaab militants as they left their camp, crossed into Kenya, hijacked a bus and killed 28 of its passengers. Of course, none picked up the bandits who mowed down 20-plus policemen in Kapedo. In Mandera, last week, as in Kapedo earlier this month, police and military scrambled after the act.

THREAT TO TOURISM

Back to Somalia. KDF went into this lawless wasteland in October of 2011 in an operation code-named Linda Nchi (Protect the Country). The incursion was triggered by Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya’s coast, the jewel in the crown of the country’s tourism industry. KDF sought to push the militias back, stop their forays into Kenya and end the threat they posed to Kenya’s security and tourism.

In February of 2012, KDF was formally integrated into Amisom, which has for years on end struggled with the seemingly Sisyphean task of propping up Mogadishu and stabilising the country.

This followed the UN Security Council Resolution 2036. So, three years later, has Operation Linda Nchi stopped Al-Shabaab attacks in and on Kenya?

No is the answer. Dangerous though Al-Shabaab is, are its militias the only security threat confronting Kenya? No is the answer.

Indeed, the President blamed local politics for the July raids in Lamu County in which more than 20 people died. No, the Kapedo massacre was not Al-Shabaab’s doing.

So, should KDF quit Somalia? Yes, absolutely. But before it exits, Nairobi should address these two dynamics. One, Kenya’s problem is not Al-Shabaab, but a security system that has failed again and again to protect Kenyans. Two, Kenya needs an intelligence-led security strategy that protects Kenyans from within its borders.

This strategy must aim to keep Al-Shabaab and sundry jihadists, drug peddlers, human traffickers and poachers, out of Kenya and to keep all inside Kenya safe. The strategy must begin with, and be implemented by, reformed law enforcement apparatuses.

These must be schooled, skilled and seasoned in pursuing security for all Kenyans any time and all the time.

The strategy must refashion the uniformed services as friends of Kenyans and the public and services encouraged to earn to co-operate with each other. Yes, security like charity must begin at home.
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