Perceptions matter in elections, but so do facts, experiences

The Kenyan general elections are expected in August 2017. However, these have already attracted numerous interpretations of the unfolding electoral process. The one category of observers who, it would be expected, would keep their cool in such times of intensely competing narratives are scholars.

Ideally, scholars should insist on distinguishing truth from myth, or, at the very least, separating credible descriptions from partisan perspectives.

We read Nic Cheeseman’s column in the Sunday Nation of November 27 titled ‘How opposition alliance can take off’ against this background but with grave concern. Cheeseman is a respected academic and an influential observer of Kenyan politics. His words carry weight in some known quarters. This is why it is unfortunate that his recent account of government and opposition strengths and weaknesses and his perspectives on regional political affiliations misrepresents key issues.

Cheeseman aims to assess the impact on elections of a possible opposition ‘super alliance.’ He focuses on the three elements. They include the capacity to control the narrative, secure votes in ‘swing’ areas and preserve a broad-based coalition. These dimensions are important, and the outline of Cheeseman’s general argument is valid. But his application of narratives of success and failure and electoral strongholds and swing areas to Kenyan politics suffers from several shortcomings.

For a start, there are the inaccurate or exaggerated claims around narratives and perceptions of Jubilee success. For instance, he claims that “if the government becomes more organised and the Opposition stands still, the election outcome is only likely to go one way.” This is a rather obvious if you can perceive of an opposition at a standstill.

His argument that “over the past 12 months, Jubilee leaders have done an impressive job of capturing the popular imagination and presenting itself as the only game in town” panders on Jubilee propaganda without considering what the outcome of its propaganda really is on the ground.

A quick review of its attempts at the Coast, Kisii and western Kenya provides evidence to the contrary. Then there is the argument attributed to “a number of pieces of analysis by journalists, academics and consultants” that “have concluded that the expanded scope and greater unity of the Jubilee Party means it has all but won the 2017 elections.” Not only are the pieces not cited but this statement coming on the heels of the imploding intra-Jubilee politics makes this but a questionable argument.

Even though Cheeseman adds the rider to the latter quote that “this analysis may not be correct”, he still invites us to uncritically accept that “perceptions are important” as they might “become a self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Control of the narrative is indeed crucial in any election. However, precisely because it is important for political actors to take control over the narrative, analysts cannot let the narratives one studies take control over them. Intellectuals have the duty of critically interrogating narratives and conventional wisdom and not simply reproducing them. The above quotes are undeniably very close to Jubilee’s view of itself.

But a party cannot be assumed to be strong just because it says so or because other people repeat its narcissistic view. While narratives matter, so do facts and experiences and Cheeseman is thin on the latter two. Government parties go to elections not only on promises, but also on performance. In this regard, Jubilee’s image is seriously tainted by rampant corruption scandals.

Corruption is real, perceived as being linked to the government and overwhelming in magnitude — to the extent that dent Kenyatta himself recently conceded the fight against corruption. True, core voters are likely to vote for Jubilee regardless, but the road to convince the undecided is long and bumpy and not subject to easy generalisations.

The issue of corruption takes us to the question of opposition weakness. This is more alluded to than spelled out in Cheeseman’s article, but the implications are there. Needless to say, the opposition has many weaknesses with regard to both its internal organisation and its external outreach.

Nevertheless, our view is that the opposition has been proactive and dynamic in keeping the government to account, not least on matters of corruption. While this has not, for obvious reasons, always blocked government proposals and policies, it has put Jubilee on the defensive and reignited the relevance of the opposition.

In fact, the numerous by-election defeats this regime has suffered, unlike previous governments and regardless of the considerable political and financial investments it makes in them, indicate that the opposition is doing quite well in protecting its comfort zones against government onslaught.

As Cheeseman completely disregards by-election results, we wonder what the basis is for his claims about the government’s success in establishing itself as the only game in town. At the heart of this is the matter of swing areas, and more particularly the repeated and well-publicised attempts by Jubilee to make inroads into Western, Kisii and Coast regions.

In these regions, new parties have been created, CORD politicians have defected (repeatedly!), and declarations of government cooperation have been made. What has been the impact of all of these efforts? From where we stand today it is difficult to see that the government will do less badly in Western, Kisii and Coast regions than in 2013. These can more adequately be described as opposition home areas. What is, therefore, likely to matter more is, again, voter registration and turn-out.

Perhaps even more crucial are suggestions of potential voter apathy in Central Kenya where the indisputable evidence on corruption recently provoked Jubilee to send the President on a grand tour of the region and into the Rift Valley to calm the base (and in view of all this, we don’t regard the recent Ipsos opinion poll as very credible). Why doesn’t this matter to Cheeseman?

Overall, in terms of perceptions of strongholds, swing regions and national inclusion, one could plausibly make the argument that the challenge is not so much for the opposition to fight off “the government’s efforts to depict (it) as a set of narrow ethnic organisations designed to simply advance the cause of one or two communities” as Cheeseman puts it. The real challenge in this regard is for the government to fight off those very same accusations from the opposition.

Ultimately, we commend Cheeseman’s efforts. Political analysts can and should try to predict and explain elections. However, this needs to be done carefully and with the degree of seriousness that the subject merits — especially in contexts where expert opinions are vulnerable to political spin or where diplomatic missions depend on this advise to construct their politics about host government.

Finally, any assessment of elections that centres on numbers presupposes that votes count, fairly and equally. Judging from the last two general elections in Kenya, this cannot be taken for granted.

Thus, surrounding and shaping debates on the 2017 elections should be the all-important matter of what will be required in order for them to be free and fair. We trust Cheeseman will continue to give as much attention to this issue as he did in ‘What Ghana polls say about 2017.’

Godwin R. Murunga teaches at the University of Nairobi and Anders Sjögren is senior researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden