Shared concerns an enduring bond between Uhuru and Ruto

What shifts are expected in Kenyan politics now that the case at the International Criminal Court against Deputy President William Ruto has been terminated?

The period before the much-awaited ruling by the ICC on the “no case to answer” application by the Deputy President witnessed the campaign to capture the Kericho Senate seat which fell vacant following the appointment of Charles Keter to the Cabinet. The Kericho by-election turned out to be a proxy war of supremacy between the Deputy President and Kanu chairman and Baringo Senator Gideon Moi, pictured, over the leadership of the Kalenjin Nation.

The strong showing by Kanu in Kericho, which recorded impressive numbers in the rallies it held during the campaign, rejuvenated the otherwise declining former ruling party and has served to consolidate Kanu into a credible fighting force again.

Even though Kanu went on to lose the election, its strong performance left the impression that Ruto’s position as the leader of the Kalenjin was no longer to be taken for granted. Kanu did enough to create evidence that it will give Ruto a real fight in the General Election in 2017.

If Kanu’s showing in Kericho signified its ascendancy as a political force in the Rift Valley, it also indicated a threat to the political future of the Deputy President, at a time when his case at the ICC remained unresolved.

It suddenly began to look as though the political cost of an adverse ICC decision against the Deputy President would not be as high as previously feared. On the evidence of the apparent rebellion against the Deputy President that the Kericho by-election suggested, it looked as though Ruto was now expendable and that in the Kanu leadership, Jubilee would find a ready replacement from among the Kalenjin community if the Deputy President was to be taken out of political circulation by the ICC.

The end of his ICC case now means that Ruto can concentrate on his political future without the uncertainty that the ICC charges brought into those plans. The end of the case has implications for the Kenyatta camp as well. If Jubilee was crafted as a mutual defence pact between the President and his Deputy, the termination of the Ruto case, which follows on that of the President’s own case, means that the pact has achieved its central objective.

This achievement is important and silences the recrimination that had become evident within the coalition that the Kenyan state was not expending as much capital in the defence of Ruto as it had done for Kenyatta. All is well that ends well and coalition members are in a position to look to a future where internal trust will increase on the evidence of the success they have had in defending both the President and his Deputy.

RUTO-MOI RIVALRY

Secondly, it is apparent that the Ruto-Moi rivalry has only just begun. Rather than resolving the difference between these two, the Kericho by-election pushed them farther apart, and there is an outstanding contest that the two must have.

It is reasonable to expect that a feature of the 2017 election will be about this rivalry. It is also clear that, at least in the open, President Kenyatta would rather not take sides regarding this rivalry.

If the ICC had put Ruto on his defence, this might have become a factor in resolving the Ruto-Moi rivalry, and might have provided Kenyatta with a basis for arguing that Moi would be a better presidential running mate than Ruto because of the ICC case. Now that Ruto is free from the ICC, this excuse is eliminated. The charges against Kenyatta and Ruto have now been terminated on terms that do not affect the possibility of fresh charges being brought against either of them in future.

While the case against Kenyatta collapsed because the very small number of potential witnesses that could have linked him with his alleged crime died or disappeared while others disavowed their earlier statements, the situation against Ruto is different.

The allegations against him are such that a large number of potential witnesses would still be available than those against Kenyatta. In theory, it would be easier to re-establish a case against Ruto than against Kenyatta.

Apart from the lack of witnesses, the other reason why it would be difficult to bring new cases against the two leaders is that as long as they remain in power, the same hostile conditions that undermined the cases against them will prevail, and no fresh cases are likely to be brought during their watch.

Other than sharing the luck of having their cases terminated, Ruto and Kenyatta also share the concern that if political circumstances change, the threat of fresh charges against one or both of them remains. Even though their cases are now over, their concerns are not, and are an enduring bond between the two.

Kenyatta, who cannot be President beyond 2022, would reason that the self-interest that a Ruto presidency would have in continuing to keep the ICC at bay would continue to benefit him after he retires. In these circumstances, sticking with Ruto rather than switching his support to Moi makes better business sense for Kenyatta.

As happened in 2013, when winning was a zero-sum consideration for Kenyatta and Ruto because of the threat of the ICC, the ICC peril has not disappeared.

It remains a powerful reason for winning the 2017 elections at all costs. The ICC, an overt factor in the 2013 elections, will be a covert consideration in the 2017 elections.

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