We are in trouble because of past actions
What you need to know:
- James Curley, a Boston Irish Catholic mayor, pushed out Protestants by letting their part of the city fall apart and giving jobs to his Irish Catholic base.
- Extra state violence was used to ensure power retention even after multipartyism in the early 1990s. Groups such as Mungiki, Kamjesh, and Jeshi la Mzee were used to keep dissidents in check
- The gangs, used by different political players, were soon out of the control of the State apparatus as the number of recruits increased and the money flowed in.
The current state of insecurity in Kenya drew me back to an article I once read by Susanne Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis”.
It travels along time to explore the genesis of insecurity in Kenya from a political viewpoint. Kenya is not only facing domestic threats but also external threats from groups such as Al-Shabaab and our response is wanting. We need to take a closer look at the underlying issues.
This state of insecurity started developing many years back. In fact, its roots sprout from the time of independence. Max Weber argues that a state is defined by its ability to control the monopoly of legitimate force. I agree. The 1982 failed coup signalled a change of the system of governance in Kenya.
As a result, the country went from being a de facto one-party state to a de jure one.
To quell dissent, the administration exerted violence that was carried out within and without institutional frameworks. This meant that State machinery and forces were used to control the opposition. People lived in fear of finding themselves on the wrong side of the divide and those who did found themselves harassed either financially or even physically.
Politicians had their own bodyguards and gangs to intimidate their opponents. The trend has continued and some MPs have recently been recorded threatening law enforcers. During election time in the 1990s, the ruling party used the Curley effect to ensure that it got votes.
James Curley, a Boston Irish Catholic mayor, pushed out Protestants by letting their part of the city fall apart and giving jobs to his Irish Catholic base. A prominent politician in Narok once warned a certain tribe to “lie low like envelopes”.
In the Coast and Rift Valley regions, elections were preceded by violence to meet the 25 per cent per province rule needed to win. The concept of kicking out the wrong tribe saw a dark time in Kenya’s history in the form of the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
This organised diffused crime has a trickle-down effect. Crime permeated society because there were no institutions to stem the bigger crimes. Extra state violence was used to ensure power retention even after multipartyism in the early 1990s. Groups such as Mungiki, Kamjesh, and Jeshi la Mzee were used to keep dissidents in check.
The gangs, used by different political players, were soon out of the control of the State apparatus as the number of recruits increased and the money flowed in. Petty criminals took advantage of this unchecked state of affairs and lawlessness flourished.
The government lost control of legitimate force because it weakened the protective institutions. When a country has a powerful Executive with personalised power at the centre, the Judiciary and Parliament become mere appendages.
When the monopoly of legitimate rule is dismantled, then security becomes a problem. In this age of terrorism, the nature of our security machinery is revealed as wanting. The system is porous because it has been weakened over the years.
No amount of machinery, intelligence, and strategies will enable us to defend our borders unless we go back to the root of the problem. We must address the past to be able to deal with the present state of insecurity.
Ms Muthamia is a graduate student at the University of Birmingham, UK. [email protected]
