El Adde: We need more information to show sacrifice
What you need to know:
In addition to analysing how al-Shabaab carried out such a deadly attack, Williams questions the battle’s aftermath and the Kenyan government’s response.
There must be figures for how many Kenyan soldiers were killed in el-Ade, and during the operation in Somalia overall.
Numbers could also help inform a discussion about current state and non-state responses to the human costs of the war.
On January 15, al-Shabaab attacked and overran an operating base of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) in el-Ade in the Gedo region of Somalia. The base was garrisoned by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops from the 9th Rifle Battalion.
Al-Shabaab claim that they killed over 100 KDF soldiers in the attack. However, the Kenyan government is yet to confirm how many soldiers were deployed in el-Ade, or how many were killed.
Indeed, with a parliamentary inquiry ongoing, little information has been released about what happened in el-Ade; the silence largely filled by a propaganda video released by al-Shabaab. Or at least that was the case until a month ago when Professor Paul Williams from George Washington University in the United States wrote a report on “The Battle at El Ade” for the International Peace Institute.
One of the key questions that Williams seeks to address is how al-Shabaab managed to overrun el-Ade given that this was the third time that an Amisom base was attacked in seven months. The use of similar tactics on all three occasions raising questions about whether the attack should have been predictable, and thus preventable.
According to Williams, “The underlying problem was the KDF’s poor operational setup and procedures in el-Ade, coupled with the decision to deploy such vulnerable forward operating bases in remote areas garrisoned by so few troops in a part of Somalia where al-Shabaab retained considerable freedom of movement.”
The report is particularly critical of the base’s poor defenses and fact that the outer defenses “comprised of thorn bushes and razor/barbed wire”, which the al-Shabaab video shows “its fighters simply threw tarpaulin over … before jumping over it”.
Other problems cited include poor communications with Ethiopian troops stationed relatively nearby, which meant that the response team had to come all the way from Kenya, and poor relations with the local population.
CARRIED OUT
In addition to analysing how al-Shabaab carried out such a deadly attack, Williams questions the battle’s aftermath and the Kenyan government’s response. Thus, while some have argued that revealing the numbers of those killed would hand al-Shabaab a propaganda victory, Williams insists that the lack of information only further exacerbates existing problems.
More specifically, Williams suggests that, “Kenya’s deliberate policy of keeping such information secret has arguably contributed to undermining its own (and Amisom’s) credibility to the extent that many Kenyans and Somalis perceive its strategic communications to be unreliable.” Williams goes on to argue that “greater clarity about the issue could help re-establish Amisom’s credibility and demonstrate the sacrifice Amisom’s troop-contributing countries have made in the effort to bring peace to Somalia.”
On the basis of these findings, the report recommends (among other things) that Kenya’s fallen peacekeepers “be honoured for their sacrifice, and their families compensated.”
Given the limited information available, I cannot say whether the report’s conclusions about why the base proved so vulnerable to attack are correct or not. However, I agree that more information is required, and that the dead should be named and acknowledged.
There must be figures for how many Kenyan soldiers were killed in el-Ade, and during the operation in Somalia overall. And I do not think that this data should be withheld—as other information, for example on intelligence and planned operations should be—in the interests of security.
On the contrary, while numbers are clearly sensitive and any figures will be contested, such information is important. First, it could help highlight the sacrifice that Kenyan soldiers have made in Somalia, and inform a related debate about whether Kenya should withdraw from the country or not.
Numbers could also help inform a discussion about current (and possible) state and non-state responses to the human costs of the war. For example, how are returning soldiers coping, especially when they have suffered injuries; and how are the families supported in their grief and loss in the case of fatalities?
Gabrielle Lynch an associate professor of comparative politics at the University of Warwick in the UK; [email protected]; @GabrielleLynch6.
