IEBC facing the same issues that dogged its predecessors

When the new team of electoral commissioners headed by Mr Wafula Chebukati took office in January, hopes were high they would offer a fresh start away from the incompetence, corruption and partisanship associated with their ousted predecessors chaired by Mr Ahmed Issack Hassan.

Now members of the former team, who were hounded out of office following an aggressive push by opposition political parties, must be quietly sniggering as the current commission digs itself into exactly the sort of maelstrom that dogged its predecessors.

If what is being witnessed so far is anything to go by, Kenya might be about to go straight into a second General Election with the electoral management body hobbled by infighting, power struggles, and incompetence.

And to make things worse, procurement of critical technology delayed as commissioners and secretariat staff working at the behest of crooked suppliers all fight for a piece of the pie.

The turbulence at the IEBC now is seen in the recent removal of key directors and the perennially botched procurement of ballot papers, voter identification systems and results transmission systems.

It all seems like a replay of exactly what afflicted the previous office and its predecessor, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission, which were both dogged by allegations of corruption and infighting.

NO ILLUSIONS

Mr Chebukati and his team of commissioners, vice chairperson Connie Maina, Dr Roselyn Kwamboka, Mr Boya Molu, Dr Paul Kurgat, Ms Margaret Mwachanya and Prof Abdi Yakub Guliye, would have had no illusions about the enormity of the task ahead taking office just eight months before the elections and with most of the preparations already in place.

They also found in place an established secretariat headed by CEO Ezra Chiloba, which had already done much of the groundwork in preparations for the General Election.

However, it seems that things started to go south almost as soon as the new chairman and his team took office and moved to assert themselves.

Instead of a smoothly functioning office, what has been witnessed is a series of botched moves that seriously call into question the IEBC’s capacity to manage a flawless General Election.

The sacking within a span of just a few days of two senior officers critical to establishment of the electoral technology systems brings to the fore instability in the IEBC with the elections just two months away.

The removal of Procurement Director Lawy Aura was made public only on Tuesday morning, although Mr Chebukati revealed he was actually fired on May 29 after being held responsible for delays in the purchase of ballot papers.

TWO DAYS

It means then that he was sacked just two days after IT Director James Muhati was suspended after being accused of refusing to respond to queries on an audit of biometric voter registration system’s licences and certificates.

Mr Aura was sacked after a scathing report by the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board which concluded that the IEBC might have deliberately bungled the ballot paper tender in order to ensure that the contract went to a favoured supplier.

The board was actually ruling on a tender that was being floated a second time after the first one was nullified following various improprieties.

With time now running out, it becomes a matter of great concern whether the IEBC will have time to start a fresh procurement and complete the process of printing and receipt of ballot papers in time for the August 8 elections.

It might well turn out that the only way the IEBC can keep to the timelines is by sidestepping the procurement regulations altogether and opting for direct award of the tender to a supplier they deem most suitable.

That direct tender route, which exposes to the IEBC risks of lawsuits by dissatisfied suppliers, has already been applied for supply of the voter identification and results transmission systems.

BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

In March, Mr Chebukati revealed that due to time and budgetary constraints, the IEBC had scrapped the already troubled procurement and award voting technology tender to the same French firm which supplied the 2013 BVR kits. Safran Identity and Security (previously Morpho) was given the contract on the basis that it offered the best timeframe for delivery and the best price and would also supply a voter identification system compatible with the voter registration kits it had supplied.

In the absence of competitive bids, however, Mr Chebukati did not find it necessary to explain how the IEBC had determined that the French company that had been involved in a similar controversy in 2013 had offered the best deal.

The direct tender to Safran was an exact replay of 2013 when after a series of botched tenders and with time running out, the previous office under Mr Hassan and then CEO James Oswago offered identical reasons for ditching the regular procurement process.

That situation in turn might have had its replica with the IIEC that was put in place as part of the settlement that disbanded Mr Samuel Kivuitu’s disgraced ECK following the 2007-2008 post-election violence.

That was the infamous ‘Chickengate’ scandal where a British security printing firm, Smith & Ouzman, was found to have given bribes to electoral officials in order to secure tenders for the printing of ballot papers.

FLAWED PROCESSES

In each of the instances, to the present, one can trace flawed procurement processes to the point that time runs out and decisions are made for direct procurement.

One can also trace infighting that often revolves both the struggle for power and also the mercenary motivation in which key officers represent the interests of rival suppliers.

Under the previous regime, for instance, the large commission was not content with being an oversight body, but from early on moved in to seize power and functions for the secretariat and assume management of operations.

Though a fully staffed professional secretariat was in place under the CEO with directors responsible for various dockets, commissioners were appointed to take charge of various functions.

This brought about some bad blood, with the rivalry between Mr Hassan and Maj (Rtd) Oswago quite often played out in public. It did not help that the two were also seen as representing the interests of rival political forces.

When the Hassan team was run out of office, the expectation was that the new and leaner set of commissioners would play its oversight role, like a board of directors and leave the secretariat room to run operations.

It has been evident, however, that Mr Chebukati and his electoral commissioners were quick to move into office on a full-time basis and usurp functions of the secretariat.