We need to come up with new strategies if we hope to triumph over Al-Shabaab

What you need to know:

  • What we need is a standby squad with a flexible chain of command. We also need to train more specialised and elite squads among the regular and Administration police and have them stationed in high risk areas.
  • Kenya’s security forces are understaffed and their numbers need to be increased. The huge budget of financing the military operation in Somalia can instead be used to boost internal security, including hiring more officers.
  • No doubt, the high rate of corruption among our security officers hinders smooth sharing of information, and this continues to fuel terrorism as security agents take bribes and allow dangerous foreigners to come in through our porous borders.

The terrorist attacks that the country has suffered in the past, the most recent one being the slaughter of 142 university students in Garissa, exposes us as a country that is out of strategy to fully win the war on terrorism.

Since 2011, when Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops pursued Al-Shabaab into Somalia, the terrorist group has mutated into a new outfit, utilising new strategies that enable it to gather intelligence and easily strike soft spots.  

Unfortunately, the security agencies in Kenya seem unable to counter the terrorists’ new mode of operation. The war against terrorism demands an integrated approach, especially taking into consideration the fact that we harbour many of the murderers and their sympathisers on our soil.

One of the critical questions we need to ask ourselves is whether we are getting any value from the expensive KDF mission in Somalia.

To begin with, the manner in which Al-Shabaab operates requires a sophisticated intelligence-gathering approach. If the attacks we have suffered are anything to go by, the intelligence is not shared properly in order to prevent attacks.

When President Uhuru Kenyatta came to power, his regime isolated Western powers due to their stand on the International Criminal Court cases against him and his deputy, Mr William Ruto.

It has taken some time to clear the standoff and Kenya has not benefited from its traditional ally, Britain, one of the fiercest critics of terrorism, which has modern intelligence-gathering techniques.

Kenya’s security agencies have failed to act, on two occasions, on travel advisories issued by Western powers warning their citizens against visiting some parts of the country. The advisories were followed by deadly attacks in Mpeketoni last year, where 60 people were killed, and in Garissa. 

The national police service and the military must be professionalised, made more representative, responsive, and accountable. Also, security agents should be motivated.

FLEXIBLE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Although we have spent considerable resources training our security personnel, there are serious gaps in how they deliver. For instance, the manner in which the highly trained Recce Squad responded to the Westgate and recent Garissa attacks exposed some serious flaws.

Despite the fact that Kenya is aware that it is high on the list of terrorists’ targets, the squad is still not well equipped, taking hours to arrive in Garissa.

What we need is a standby squad with a flexible chain of command. We also need to train more specialised and elite squads among the regular and Administration police and have them stationed in high risk areas.

One of the key areas we have not had much success is community policing, arguably the most effective way of providing security and gathering intelligence. Although there have been attempts to rebrand the police force, naming it a police service, the relationship between the public and law enforcement agencies is still frosty and characterised by suspicion.

No doubt, the high rate of corruption among our security officers hinders smooth sharing of information, and this continues to fuel terrorism as security agents take bribes and allow dangerous foreigners to come in through our porous borders.

Kenya’s security forces are understaffed and their numbers need to be increased. The huge budget of financing the military operation in Somalia can instead be used to boost internal security, including hiring more officers.

The police-to-civilian ratio in Kenya is 1:800, way below the United Nation’s recommended ratio of one policeman for 400 civilians. And a significant number of these police officers, including the highly trained ones, are assigned to guard VIPs. This makes it difficult for such officers to respond to emergencies.

Kenya must move fast to address the root causes of youth radicalisation, the most obvious one being unemployment. Survivors’ accounts and reports from the police indicate that terrorist attacks in Kenya are executed by men aged between 18 and 25.

Youth unemployment, estimated to be 70 per cent in Kenya and placed at 60 per cent in Africa, is a major cause of radicalisation, which fuels terrorism.
Mr Obonyo is a Global Young Diplomat and the external adviser on the UN Habitat’s Youth Advisory Board. [email protected]