Why Kenya lost African balance-of-power game

Kenya is reeling from the stunning loss of its Foreign Affairs Minister Amina Mohamed’s bid for the chairmanship of the African Union Commission (AUC). She lost to her Chadian counterpart Moussa Faki Mahamat. Strategic miscalculations, vested interests and the continental balance of power conspired to hand Kenya defeat on its maiden stab at the apex of continental leadership.

There is no question that Kenya made a good account of itself, winning a number of rounds and ultimately losing by just three votes. However, rather than “accept and move on”, impartial reflection and soul-searching should ideally inform a review of the debacle, if Kenya is to draw lessons from the loss.

Many questions linger. How the rather late decision to offer Ms Mohamed for the contest reached and what was Kenya’s game plan? Was the decision based on expat analysis or was it spurred by gut-feeling? What does the loss say about the quality of Kenya’s diplomatic missions, for instance, in providing intelligence on a high-stake issue such as the election was?

A campaign of this magnitude required that the special envoys be competent and experienced diplomats able to read between the lines, analyse the choice of words and body language of the targeted foreign elites and accurately interpret responses. Given the voting patterns, it is highly doubtful that this was the case.

SPECIAL ENVOYS

Ms Mohamed went around the continent with special envoys, including Deputy President William Ruto. The norm in campaigns of this nature is that envoys do not accompany the candidate on the campaign trail. This is because the parties being lobbied would baulk at candidly proffering their viewpoints in the presence of the candidate. Secondly, by relying almost entirely on the foreign affairs honchos, the campaign missed out on potential envoys from academia and the corporate world that would carry succour in certain capitals. Thirdly, upbeat announcements were made of Kenya securing the support of several countries. This was a strategic misstep as it would have been more strategic for the pledging countries to announce their support on their own. It puts into question the strategic communication approaches that were employed. Overall, there is a sense in which the Kenyan hubris of clinching the top position was a blind spot for the campaign. In tandem with a domestic rather that outward analysis of the campaign, media reports framed Ms Mohamed as a “front-runner”, her success as a fait accompli. We now know that pledges of support from certain countries ought to have been considered more judiciously.

ERASTUS MWENCHA

From a moral perspective, Kenya was perceived as greedy in gunning for the position. Kenya’s Erastus Mwencha was elected vice-chairman of the AU Commission in January 2008 in the midst of the 2007 post-election violence. He was re-elected in 2012 in a very ill-tempered contest pitting Dlamini Zuma against Gabonese Jean Ping. Kenya clinched the vice-chairmanship by aligning with the Jean Ping team, a strategic move that secured the decisive Franchophone Africa vote. It is understood that a number of countries were dead-set against Kenya successively moving from the vice-chairmanship position to that of chairperson. There might have been also a sentiment that Kenya ought to have reciprocated favours such as support in the ICC imbroglio by not presenting a candidate.

Every election has core campaign issues and players. Morocco’s return to the AU was a major issue in this election. Morocco’s return is seen as inimical to the interests of the Saharawi Republic, a full member of the AU. By openly running counter to Morocco’s interests in favour of the Saharawi Republic, Kenya badly miscalculated as it ended up against a potent and well-resourced foe. In 2015, the World Bank ranks Kenya at number 71 with a GDP of $63,398 while Morocco is ranked number 60 with a GDP of $100,593. Rabat’s interests might have tipped the scales against the Kenyan candidate.

A BATTLEGROUND

The AU is the theatre of continental politics and therefore a battleground for African hegemons during elections. A key question is whether an in-depth analysis on the interests of the continental pivot nations was considered? Reportedly, Algeria, a major Arab-Maghreb power, threw its weight behind Chad. South Africa, virtually the African “superpower”, aligned with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) position – the abstention card. It is not clear what position Nigeria, the continent’s most populous nation and leading nation in GDP terms, took. It doesn’t however inspire confidence that Nigeria did not come out in the open rooting for Kenya.

Moreover, the question of morality underpins an unwritten rule that bigger African countries should not occupy the AUC Chair position. This is the “original sin” that South Africa committed in 2012 by rupturing an established norm when it went flat out to oust Jean Ping. In the end, outgoing chief Nkozasana Dlamini Zuma won mainly because of South Africa’s diplomatic and material sway on the continent. A key take-away from the 2012 and the recent contests is that there is no asymmetrically superior nation in the continent’s balance of power. Power is more or less evenly distributed in the southern, central, western and northern reaches of the continent.

ONE REASON

The multi-polarity of the balance of power on the continent is one reason that makes the proposition for a smaller nation to hold the AUC chairmanship reasonable. It would discourage potentially fractious, zero-sum competition for hegemonic power at the AU level by such as power poles as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Algeria and Senegal. While Kenya is a leader among equals in the eastern region, it is not an outright power pivot, because Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania are not too far behind as contenders. In a nutshell, this is the problem that Kenya wedded into. Chad has thus struck a blow for the return to the pre-2012 status quo.

MATERIAL CAPABILITIES

In the balance of power scheme of things, the success of a country in competitive circumstances – such as the AU elections – depends on a state’s material capabilities and alliances with other states. The political clout of nations correlates closely with their economic power. Dollar by dollar, Kenya seems to have lost out to old and new alliances that emerged at the elections. For instance, Kenya was seen as representing the interests of Anglophone Africa vis-à-vis Francophone Africa. Commonwealth Africa comprises 18 nations while Francoafrique has 26 nations. In a pure “us versus them”, friend and foe analysis, Kenya started off on a back foot. It is indeed probable that third parties such as France played a role in bolstering mostly West and Central Africa position. On the other hand, increasingly isolationist post-Brexit Britain – the guarantor of Anglophone Africa – watched from the side lines. Clearly, the Francophone alliance was cohesive while the Anglophone bloc fractured in multiple ways as evidenced by Anglophone SADC’s abstention. Furthermore, it appears that the eastern Africa bloc, where Kenya is supposedly the asymmetrical power, is perhaps the most fractured of all the economic communities as witness the short-lived “coalition of the willing” formation and recent oil pipeline wars.

THREATENS INTERESTS

The apparent resistance to Kenya’s continental ascendency is informed by the fact that it threatens the interests of other African states and regions. Going forward, Kenya needs to radically rethink its African foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Kenya has various options: turn inward and mind its own business; strategically retaliate against countries that let it down (a hard power option); seek rapprochement with foes and bolster relations with allies (a soft power option); and settle for a continental power-broker position (a smart power option). In all these options lies the country’s ambition for continental leadership.

Bob Wekesa is post-doctoral fellow, University of the Witwatersrand.

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