Electoral reform panel's proposals hit the right notes, but now what?
What you need to know:
- By ensuring that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) uses the Electronic Voter ID (EVID) on the polling day, in conjunction with the data collected earlier by Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits, we can eliminate the issue of impersonation.
- By electronically running the voter register against other databases, such as the birth or national ID register, one can easily resolve the question of who should or should not be on the voter register.
- In summary, the report does address the ICT challenges experienced in the last general elections. However, it remains to be seen if its recommendations will be implemented over the coming months.
After several Mondays of street battles, tear gas and unfortunate deaths in the campaign to eject electoral officials from office, the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on the commission was formed to address the issues.
It finally tabled its comprehensive and voluminous report that touches on the institutional, legislative and operational aspects of our electoral processes. We take a look at some of the key ICT-related recommendations in the report.
I must say that I am glad that most of the recommendations include those that I have consistently highlighted in previous blogs— but no one was listening.
One key recommendation is to amend Section 44 of the 2011 Elections Act to make the use of ICTs in our electoral process mandatory.
Currently, the use of ICTs is not mandatory, hence the less than casual interest the petitioners and the Supreme Court gave to the electronic failures experienced in the 2013 presidential petition.
By ensuring that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) uses the Electronic Voter ID (EVID) on the polling day, in conjunction with the data collected earlier by Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits, we can eliminate the issue of impersonation.
Without the above devices, it is relatively easy for agents in their respective "strongholds" to conspire and agree to vote on behalf of the absentee or the dead voter.
Typically, not everyone who registered shows up to vote. Once voting is closed, each polling station has a balance of ballots that can easily be completed to "vote" in favour of one candidate or another.
TECHNOLOGY'S LIMITATIONS
The EVID eliminates this possibility since it requires each voter to be biometrically (fingerprint) signed into the polling station before casting his or her vote. The number of ballot papers that would be maliciously cast without the voters being biometrically verified will then be very easy to tabulate.
This is all nice and good, but technology has some limitations. Occasionally this equipment may experience what is known as ‘false-negatives’. You may turn up at the polling station but the EVID fails to recognize your fingerprint and subsequently denies you the chance to vote.
This possibility exists and there needs to be mechanisms to deal with this in a manner that is still transparent, accountable and verifiable at a later stage.
The other key recommendation is to have the voter register audited by reputable external organizations. There have been allegations that the current voter register has illegal entries, including underage and dead voters
Given the millions of records to be verified, it is clear that such a process cannot be effectively completed without electronic interventions.
By electronically running the voter register against other databases, such as the birth or national ID register, one can easily resolve the question of who should or should not be on the voter register.
But more importantly, there will be the need to put in place procedures that ensure that illegal entries cannot be reintroduced in the voter register as we move closer to the election day. Alternatively, if they are introduced, the procedure can still detect and isolate them at a later stage.
ADDITIONAL NETWORK SUPPLIERS
Finally, the use of ICTs in transmitting, particularly the Presidential results has been emphasized in the report. The electronic results transmission system (RTS) increases the transparency of the process while managing the expectations of both the winners and losers in the contest.
The random and instantaneous transmission of voting results from over 35,000 polling stations denies political parties the time and intelligence required to estimate the number of votes required to cross over the magic number of 50 per cent plus one.
A working results transmission system will therefore significantly cut down the amount of possible mischief in manipulating results.
The fact that only one of the telco operators has the detailed network coverage for all the polling stations across the country was also cited as a risk in the report.
Perhaps the IEBC should consider engaging additional network suppliers, particularly those with satellite communication capabilities in order to provide the necessary redundancy required to ensure the RTS system delivers this time around.
In summary, the report does address the ICT challenges experienced in the last general elections. However, it remains to be seen if its recommendations will be implemented over the coming months.
After all, one tested and reliable method for releasing public pressure is often to buy time through the creation of a committee to study the problem. The question of implementing its recommendations often arises well after public pressure has subsided and is no longer urgent.
Mr Walubengo is a lecturer at the Multimedia University of Kenya, Faculty of Computing and IT. Email: [email protected], Twitter: @jwalu
