Does Uhuru envisage a role for opposition in his government?

President Uhuru Kenyatta addressing Kenyans at Moi Sports Center, Kasarani on December 12, 2017 during 54th Jamhuri day celebrations. PHOTO | JEFF ANGOTE | NATION MEDIA GROUP

What you need to know:

  • The jostling for influence within Jubilee is likely to affect the kind of government Kenyatta forms.
  • The first would be to agree to formal talks with the opposition.

Today, Kenya gets to see off a troubled year, during which the country went through an unprecedented two presidential elections. As a new year begins tomorrow, the country will be hoping for better times, even though some of the issues that the elections raised remain unresolved.

Because of the protracted nature of the elections, there has been delay in the commencement of the second and last term for President Uhuru Kenyatta, which will now coincide with the beginning of a new year.

In a sense, how Kenyatta performs in 2018 will shape not only his legacy but also the future of the country.

UNCERTAINITY

Other than an economy that has been damaged by political uncertainty, putting millions of livelihoods under threat, the priority issue for the country is the how to address the anger that the 2017 elections have left in their wake.

The most immediate act for Kenyatta as the year begins will be to form a government. His approach and choices could offer an indication of how he proposes to tackle these issues, besides contributing to overcoming the tentativeness that still characterises his administration, long after what his side claims to be another electoral victory, but which the opposition disputes.

The composition of his new government will also provide an early indication of how Kenyatta’s presidency will ultimately be judged and will also provide a sense of what is going on inside Jubilee with regard to the post-Kenyatta re-alignment.

Further, how Kenyatta composes his government will also shape the relationship between his government and the rest of the country, particularly the opposition.

Inside Jubilee, there is already a clear perception that Baringo Senator Gideon Moi, who has had to play second fiddle to Deputy President William Ruto, has been compelled to force issues in a bid to make up for lost ground in becoming a player in the post-Kenyatta era.

JUBILEE

The unmistakable visibility that the younger Moi has been courting lately – crowned by his appointment as the new chancellor for Kabarak University where he has taken over from his father -- is a display of political symbols that Moi is readying himself for a greater role than he is currently exercising.

The jostling for influence within Jubilee is likely to affect the kind of government Kenyatta forms and also the level of control he will maintain during his second term.

Without a careful balancing of the competing interests in Jubilee, Kenyatta’s second term could be characterised by open disagreements inside his party, quickening the loss of control that a leader serving on a final period of office traditionally suffers from. It would also rob the President of the kind of authority that he needs to address issues that affect the national interest.

Outside Jubilee, Kenyatta faces an angry country, much of which supports plans by the opposition leadership to swear in Raila Odinga as its symbolic president. At the rhetorical level, Kenyatta maintains that elections are over, and it is time to open a new chapter that is not burdened by current or past grievances.

However, Kenyatta would know that he might be forced to negotiate with the opposition not only as part of tidying up the fallout from the elections but also as a matter of his legacy. What influence, if any, are the outstanding issues with the opposition likely to have on the formation of government?

CRISIS

In 2007, as a crisis raged after Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as President for a second term, the beleaguered Kibaki formed a partial government, in a move that further aggravated the political crisis. Kibaki could have formed a full government at once but chose not to, possibly because he felt the need to leave room for negotiations with the opposition.

With appointment to cabinet now requiring parliamentary approval, which was not the case in 2007, the situation is more complicated and Kenyatta would feel a greater need for hesitancy.

A number of questions, though, remain unanswered. Does Kenyatta envisage a role for the opposition in his government, and if so what role? How would he hope to bring this about? With so many other interests to serve, besides meeting the demands within Jubilee, just what room would be left for meeting those interests through the nature of government that Kenyatta forms?

Kenyatta has two possible approaches that he could consider. The first would be to agree to formal talks with the opposition. On its own, agreement on a structure for the talks will take time, as will the content.

Agreeing to such talks would somewhat be viewed as a climb-down within Jubilee and because they could complicate vested interests in the party, Kenyatta would also have to overcome internal opposition just to get everyone to table.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

The second approach could be to negotiate privately with interests within the opposition. As part of this approach, Kenyatta could offer spoils to individuals in the opposition and, to secure the support of Ruto for such a plan, the Deputy President could be allowed in on the deal-making.

A deal of this nature would probably include a promise of inclusion in post-Kenyatta power arrangements.

The second approach would essentially be a deal to isolate and marginalise Odinga, the main protagonist if Jubilee were to hold structured negotiations with the opposition.

Taking this approach would largely preserve the status quo in the country, complete with the uncertainties that come with elections. Such an approach will be sold as a responsible form of “accept and move on”, and something that brings closure to the 2017 elections.

The main drawback with the second approach is that it is likely to leave the underlying problems unaddressed. The difficulty with selling this approach to opposition individuals is that at least two of them, Kalonzo Musyoka and Musalia Mudavadi, have been there before and ultimately emerged empty-handed.

Their experiences make it abundantly clear that there is no honour in Kenyan politics and those who go into this type of deal-making do so with the clear risk that they could face betrayal themselves, even as they also have to endure accusations that they are traitors.

In all this, the long-suffering people of Kenya deserve a better year than the one that is ending today.