How bid to set up small pineapple farms failed

On the outskirts of Thika, fruit vendors eke out a living selling pineapples on the roadside at Sh100 a piece. Most of the fruits come from Kiambu, where remnants of the smallholder farms still exist after a Jomo Kenyatta-era experiment collapsed. Pineapples sold in other towns come from Uganda and Tanzania.

What went wrong, and how was a cash crop that was to lift thousands of families out of poverty left in the hands of a giant corporation? Newly- released archival documents reveal the intrigues that prevented hundreds of farmers from selling their fruits abroad, and why Del Monte was left as the major exporter.

It is the untold story of how powerful Agriculture Permanent Secretary Geoffrey Kariithi pushed his officers to start smallholder pineapple farms at a time when scientists at the ministry had advised against growing the fruit at more than 5,700ft above sea level. Such politically instigated projects usually go wrong, and this one went south fast.

ABANDONED FARMERS

The documents are an indictment on policymakers who urged farmers to invest in the new cash crop only to later abandon them. As a result, despite its good weather, Kenya imports pineapples from her neighbours, who ironically got their first suckers from Thika in the 1960s.

From the beginning, the Canning Crops Board Chairman Christopher Manavu had impressed upon Mr Kariithi that the country needed quality pineapples if it was to enter the international market as per the agreement between the government and the US firm, which was to help market the Kenyan produce under the Del Monte label.

“The board has had some misgivings on the subject of quality and is only too keenly aware that the California Packing Corporation (Calpac) made it a condition on their future expansion that we, in the first place, deliver the goods up to the quality standards demanded during the first expansion phase,” wrote Mr Manavu.

But, in his reply dated August 27, 1965, Mr Kariithi rapped Mr Manavu for his “misgivings on the subject of quality”. “I cannot but take it that your board has taken a very negative and non-progressive attitude towards the ability and the inspiration of the small-scale farmers who, as you no doubt know, are the majority in the country …” he said.

It had been expected that the phased planting would produce the 20,300 tonnes that was required by the expanded canning factory in Thika by 1968. After that, the planting was to be expanded methodically and extension officers would help farmers prepare their plots.

That was never done, although Mr Kariithi had told Mr Manavu that the government had a “definite and precise programme” to ensure the target expansion tonnage would be achieved by that date.

Your arrangement with the California Packing Corporation ... is a clear indication that your board is prejudiced against the success of the small-scale producer.”

Further, in his later, Mr Kariithi said the Department of Agriculture “has gone into immense trouble” to work out a phased planting programme to ensure regular supply to the factory “not only of the expansion tonnage but including the existing licensed tonnage from the small-scale sector”.

In order to shield the country, the Canning Crops Board had pledged to buy pineapples from some large-scale planters around Thika, but Mr Kariithi saw this as sabotage and he told Mr Manavu as much.

“Your arrangement with the California Packing Corporation to underwrite a reasonable tonnage to be grown by large-scale farmers in case our expectations from smallholders are not achieved is a clear indication that your board is prejudiced against the success of the small-scale producer,” he said.

By then, canning of pineapples was being done by the Kenya Canners in Thika, and Kenya Orchard, which was processing juice. In 1965, two years after independence, the Kenyatta government was desperate to find a new cash crop for Gatundu farmers.

INTENSIFY DEVELOPMENT

Some pineapples had been introduced to Kiambu farmers following the Swynnerton Plan of 1953 drawn by R.J.M Swynnerton, the assistant director of agriculture. This was a counter-insurgency plan to intensify development of African agriculture in the wake of the Mau Mau revolt. The plan recommended land consolidation, introduction of cash crops and giving of loans to Africans with title deeds.

By 1965, when the Kenyatta campaign started to woo more smallholder farmers, these growers were supplying the local market with 11,700 tonnes a year, which was below the targeted levels for commercial production. In the arrangement, brokers and traders would buy the pineapples at the farm gate and deliver them to the Thika factory for local consumption.

While signing the deal with Calpac, the Kenyatta government gave an undertaking that “the outgrowers (will not only) provide sufficient tonnage of pineapples but also that they will provide pineapples of suitable quality” for export. This was according to a letter by Bruce McKenzie, then-Minister for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, dated 1965.

GREAT CARE

But was that possible for a community that had never grown pineapples before and with no experience in growing fruits for export? Commercial pineapple farming required great care and, according to a letter from M.C. Phillips, an adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture, the smallholder expansion would have required “expensive preparation of the land, and the use of fertilisers, fumigants and soil dressing”.

In order to support the Kenyatta project, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was brought on board to make the necessary loan finance of an estimated £79,040 up to the long rains of 1967 when it was hoped that the first crop would be ready.

A note dated July 15, 1965 from Mr Phillips to the AFC General Manager, Mr C.D. Westoby, said: “Repayment of the loans will be made at the time of marketing the crop and will be deducted at the source when the pineapples are delivered to the cannery”.

The government purchased fertiliser and chemicals, which were distributed by the British firm BEA Corporation, which was part of Mitchell Cotts, a trading company. As lorry-loads of suckers were sent to Murang’a and Kiambu, the AFC agreed to set aside £60,000 for the special project. The planting materials were ordered from Simpson and Whitelaw Ltd, later acquired by the government and renamed Simlaw Seeds.

The only question was whether farmers should be given the loans in kind or cash. In a letter dated August 9, 1965, Treasury adviser Joan Tyrrell proposed that AFC should give the loan in kind rather than cash. The Treasury, which was under pressure to release money for the project, said it could not commit any money “and these loans will have to be met permanently from the AFCs own resources”.

Whether this had future ramifications on the development of a smallholder pineapple industry is still not clear. Another poser that emerged was the control of Mealbugs, which had been brought to the new farms by unclean materials from elsewhere.

To attract farmers to start growing pineapples, campaigns were conducted in Murang’a and Kiambu, targeting a desired harvest of 42,000 tonnes, which Mr McKenzie had promised the US firm in order to invest at the Kenya Canners factory.

In the rush to implement what was essentially a political project, the bureaucrats forgot they had to organise the farmers into a cooperative society and follow the pattern that had been introduced to coffee farmers. It was realised, rather late, that it would be easier to manage the pineapple farmers within a cooperative rather than give them loans and hope that Kenya Canners would deduct the money.

Time was running out and the fear was that Calpac would not wait anymore for Kenya to organise the smallholder farmers. The Agriculture Director James Mburu admitted in one of his notes that “time will not allow us to insist that all loanees be licensed through a cooperative society (but) we are making it a condition of the Agreement Form that such loanees will join a cooperative society and deliver only through that society and to authorise them to deduct at source the repayment due”.

SIGN LETTER

The government quickly registered the Pineapple Growers Cooperative Society and all new farmers were asked to sign a “letter of hypothecation” that not only offered their farms to secure a debt but also committed to deliver their produce to Kenya Canners. Early reports by extension officers, especially in Githunguri and Kiambaa, indicated that there was little enthusiasm. “Farmers are sceptical as earlier attempts to plant the fruit (following the Swynnerton Plan) ware followed by theft and lack of a good market,” one extension officer reported.

Later, when applications were received, it was found that the applicants were in excess of the acreage required for the project.

Another concern raised by the Canning Crops Board to Mr Mburu was whether cooperatives were best-placed to take over the task carried out by traders and brokers. In a letter dated August 23, 1965, the board chairman posed: “From our experience, before a cooperative can handle the volume of business now dealt with by the traders, it will be necessary for it to set up an efficient and effective transport service to cope with the entire crop from smallholder farmers without any setback being suffered by the whole industry”.

'GREAT DISSERVICE'

That system was not there and farmers did not know that to grow high-quality pineapples required proper use of fumigants and fertilisers.

Mr Kariithi felt that the Canning Crops Board was trying to do a “great disservice” to the country by embarking on a policy that could lead to the loss of public funds. The policy Mr Manavu had proposed was to encourage large-scale farmers to also start growing pineapples — just in case Kariithi’s project failed.

But Mr Kariithi was in a fighting mood as he pushed smallholders to start growing pineapples.

“The Ministry requires an assurance from your board to the effect that the arrangements such as the one you are contemplating and which, in my opinion, will encourage surplus production will not directly or indirectly jeopardise the success of the small-scale production programme,” he said.

Mr Kariithi proposed that, by 1968, private traders should be phased out by the time the first crop financed on loan started arriving to the factory and which should be delivered through the cooperatives to “eliminate the possibilities of the loanees being tempted to sell their pineapples through traders to avoid repayments of loans granted to them”.

QUALITY COMPROMISED

But Mr Manavu shot back, in his letter dated September 13, 1965, and told Mr Kariithi that he must appreciate that “it is unfortunate that most of the small-scale growers live in areas which are becoming more and more unsuitable for quality pineapple production but this should not be blamed on my board … until the actual fruits are harvested and tested no one can guarantee quality and quantity especially when we are opening new areas”.

That was the heart of the problem. The truth was that Mr Kariithi was opening farms at elevations where scientists had warned could compromise pineapple quality. It was now upon Calpac to determine whether the quality from high altitudes could be canned.

From the start, quality was one of the conditions set by Calpac when they decided to invest in Kenya Canners and for the use of their Del Monte label to market the Kenyan fruits.

Mr Manavu’s fears came to pass as soon as Del Monte started processing fruits grown above 5,700ft.