Why the economy performed dismally under Moi

President Daniel arap Moi waves to the crowd as he leaves Nyayo National Stadium after officiating Jamhuri Day celebrations on December 12, 2002. The Keiyo and the Marakwet were the sub-groups among the Kalenjin most identified with Moi. PHOTO | SIMON MAINA | AFP

What you need to know:

  • His survival depended on procuring — literary — a group of Kalenjin teachers who would be loyal to him and who would be grateful.
  • Policies came from his own pronouncements especially in public rallies and/or when meeting groups of people.

Since February 4, when it was announced that retired President Daniel arap Moi had died, many comments have been made about him and his leadership.

Some have passed him as a popular and amiable leader. To others, the man was simply a despot and authoritarian who stepped on the toes of critics.

What is strange in these observations is that there are many academic writings about Moi by scholars based in Kenya and abroad.

None of these writings, even when he was alive, passed him as a democrat or a popular leader.

Some of the articles written in the 1980s and 90s, the peak of Moi’s leadership, show a president whose main aim was to control and restrict what was done.

Although his style of leadership is not the subject of these articles, it bears mentioning that he had a tendency to use and dump — and then reuse — senior politicians at different times.

Those he used and dumped would become extremely loyal to him once they were recycled.

As young scholars at the then Department of Government at the University of Nairobi, we were disturbed by this mode of rule and governance and we made it a subject of study.

AGRICULTURE SLUMPS

We studied it and found that no other leader in Africa behaved like Moi. Furthermore, it was this mode of governance that contributed to the collapse of the economy and key sectors.

How did the economy perform under Moi? Moi came to power in 1978. Economic growth was at 6.9 per cent after a drop from 9.1 per cent in 1977.

During his leadership, and specifically from 1980, growth considerably declined. Growth dropped from 7.6 per cent in 1979 to 5.6 per cent in 1980.

Kenya’s growth did not pick up thereafter during his reign. It declined much further in the 1990s.

By early 2002, when Moi was leaving office, growth had dropped to 0.6 per cent. Agriculture, Kenya’s main sector, did not do well throughout Moi’s tenure.

For 24 years he ruled, it collapsed at least seven times. Agriculture collapsed 30 per cent of the time of his tenure for reasons explained below.

LEADERSHIP STYLE

He came to power in 1978 when agriculture was growing at 3.8 per cent. In 1980, growth slumped to one per cent but increased rapidly in 1982 to 7.4 per cent.

But actual collapse took place in 1984 when growth reduced to -3.5 per cent.

Between 1984 and 2002 when he left office, agriculture as a sector had literally collapsed — it was growing at a negative rate almost throughout the period.

In fact, in 2002, growth had reduced to -3.4 per cent. The sector was revived by President Mwai Kibaki and his National Rainbow Coalition (Narc) government.

Why did this happen? Why did the economy perform this poorly? First, because of President Moi’s style of leadership and how he appointed people to manage various sectors.

He had an appetite for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu schoolteachers. He picked some of them from classroom to come to Nairobi to head government ministries and departments.

He identified others to head parastatals. Many of those he picked had no experience in managing public sector institutions.

Studies carried out throughout the 80s and 1990s — including by yours truly — revealed that Moi picked these teachers because he wanted to build an elite group of his own.

INCOMPETENT LEADERS

He came to power surrounded especially by Kikuyu elites, some of whom did not like him. To them he was a passing cloud.

To them he was from a backward Tugen community and therefore they thought he would continue counting on the Kikuyu elites for advice on how to govern.

One particular study by Oscar Mwangi shows that at one time, over half of parastatals were in the hands of the Kalenjin and these other groups.

Very few managing directors had the relevant qualification to run a public sector institution. Their relevant qualification was the tribe — being a Kalenjin, or Kamatusa.

Another study by Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o explains that this was meant to destroy what President Jomo Kenyatta had built.

In his view, Moi had to create a new group of elites different from those he met in office.

His survival depended on procuring — literary — a group of Kalenjin teachers who would be loyal to him and who would be grateful for being picked from the classroom to government ministries and parastatals.

Another study by David Throup — and a subsequent study in 1994 by me — showed that Moi was in a hurry to build a new class of elites loyal to him.

APPROPRIATING RESOURCES

He had to use Asians to finance this new class. Asian banks provided the funds — through deposits by parastatals — which the new Kalenjin elites would use to get loans and feel confident to face the Kikuyu elites.

Of course some could not repay the loans but nothing could be done.

Related to this was the issue of giving the new Kalenjin elite government property — including land in major towns — which they would then sell immediately.

But it is not the Kalenjin elites alone who were helped with land and other public resources, including government houses.

The president had to court leaders from all over the country and had to keep them close by giving them properties.

Some became so loyal that they could not tolerate any criticism of the government. Again, it is not all the Kalenjin sub-groups that benefited.

The Keiyo and the Marakwet were the sub-groups among the Kalenjin most identified with Moi.

For this reason, he tended to get some of the parastatal chiefs from these two areas irrespective of education.

STATE POLICIES

The second reason for running down the economy had to do with personalisation of policies.

Policies came from his own pronouncements especially in public rallies and/or when meeting groups of people.

Roadside pronouncements became an important source of government policies. Treasury mandarins had a difficult time coping these pronouncements.

The best they could do was to carry notebooks and listen attentively to speeches so that they could identify what should be done.

There was no public participation in decision-making processes at any level. Neither were there strong analytical discussions on what to do about the economy.

And when the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund insisted on introducing Structural Adjustment Programmes to revive the economy, Moi decided to play the “hide and seek” game.

Every time Kenya’s creditors met in Paris under the Paris Club (which used to discuss how to establish a coordinated approach to payments of loans by indebted countries), Kenya would agree to key principles.

However, Kenya would immediately renege on these terms the moment the money was released.

NEGLECT OF CASH CROPS

The manner in which policies were made contributed to a decline in agricultural productivity for several reasons.

Moi de-emphasised the policy to support export crops such as coffee and tea. These were the principal crops but were grown in areas opposed to him — central Kenya.

Within a short period, he announced a new policy to support the growing of cereal crops, maize and wheat, on the argument that he wanted the country to be food secure.

With this policy announcement, the government’s attention radically shifted to supporting maize and wheat farming. Ironically, growth of these is dominant in his home base of the Rift Valley.

Finally, there was increased neglect of rules and institutions. Everything was personalised. Rules for making and implementing macro-economic policies were thrown out of the window.

Personality culture where Moi was the centre of decision-making became the modus operandi — everything began and ended with him.

Many bureaucrats, therefore, feared making decisions on their own. Formal rules and institutions were replaced with informality — even where critical national decisions were required to be made.