How President Kenyatta used British intelligence to spy on his VP Odinga

What you need to know:

  • New book says an agent from MI5 was detailed to ‘keep an eye on Odinga’

Kenya’s founding President Jomo Kenyatta sought the help of British spies to protect his government against a suspected plot by his vice-president to overthrow him, according to a new book.

Mzee Kenyatta and his lieutenant Charles Njonjo were worried that Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was receiving money from communist countries and was likely to destabilise or overthrow the government.

Mzee Kenyatta and Jaramogi had, in the run-up to independence, a great desire for a free Kenya but their ideologies were different.

While Mr Odinga had wanted the British colonialists to leave at once, Kenyatta wanted Kenyans to “forgive and forget” the past. Those who wished to remain in Kenya after independence were welcome.

Spy agency

The political differences introduced a major strain between the President and his VP, and Mzee Kenyatta turned to the British spy agency, MI5, for help, according to a recently published official history of the intelligence organisation.

The declassified MI5 material shows why, in their understanding, Mr Odinga refused to assume the premiership in 1961 unless Mzee Kenyatta was first released from detention.

Mr Odinga held that Mr Kenyatta was the man to lead Kenya to independence and once called him “Kenya’s second god.” But, as he was about to discover, he had grossly misunderstood the man.

“Odinga had probably expected him (Kenyatta) to emerge from prison as a shadow of his former self – about 70 years old (no one knew his exact age), physically feeble, alcoholic, out of touch and a figurehead whom Odinga could dominate,” writes Prof Christopher Andrew in Defend the Realm.

Be confiscated

“Instead, Odinga found himself outmanoeuvred by Kenyatta, who distanced himself from Kanu’s election programme and promised settlers that they would be welcome to stay in independent Kenya and that their property would not be confiscated.”

The author, a Cambridge professor, adds: “The Intelligence in which Kenyatta took the most interest concerned the activities of the pro-Communist Odinga ...With assistance from senior members of the Special Branch, whom Kenyatta had asked to stay on after the end of British rule, at least one of Odinga’s houses was bugged.”

On December 12, 1964, the first anniversary of Kenya’s independence and the day Kenya became a republic, Mzee Kenyatta asked former Commonwealth secretary Duncan Sandys if the British could produce “any documentary proof of Odinga receiving money from the Chinese.”

“Kenyatta said that he was well aware of these subventions but could not effectively deal with Odinga unless he could confront him with specific evidence. Though no usable evidence seems to have been forthcoming, the Special Branch identified the main conduit by which Odinga received funds from China,” writes Prof Andrew.

The book does not identify the conduit.

However, in April 1965, Mr Njonjo, the attorney-general, informed the British High Commissioner Malcom Macdonald of reports that Mr Odinga and his associates were plotting a coup. Mr Njonjo requested the intervention of British troops.

The anticipated coup did not materialise.

Arms seized

“Odinga’s offices were searched and several crates of machine guns, grenades and other arms were seized. Soon afterwards, Kenyatta gave the Soviet ambassador a furious dressing down after the arrival of a Soviet arms shipment apparently arranged by Odinga. The arms were sent back to Russia.”

The appointment of Mr Odinga to the VP’s position at independence was widely viewed as a reward for the demands he had made to the colonialists that Mzee Kenyatta be released before Kanu could assume the reins of power.

But by 1965, their political relationship had collapsed as the two engaged in a contest of might, which Mr Odinga lost in 1966.

But Mzee Kenyatta wasn’t ready to break his relations with British agents just yet.

Research desk

“Soon after Odinga’s sacking, the Head of Training was asked to carry out a review of Kenya’s Intelligence. He recommended the secondment of a British intelligence officer to head a research desk which would coordinate intelligence assessments and produce reports for Kenyatta and other members of his administration and the creation of a National Security Executive to oversee the intelligence community.

“His report was accepted in its entirety and an MI5 officer was appointed in January 1967 as both head of the research desk and secretary of the new National Security Executives,” writes Prof Andrew.

Britain’s Ministry of Overseas Development paid the officer’s salary on the “possibly dubious” grounds that he was providing technical assistance. The officer said Mzee Kenyatta had asked him to “keep an eye on Odinga”. This gave the MI5 officer access to the Kenyan Special Branch files.

University of Nairobi historian Godfrey Muriuki says Mzee Kenyatta did not have much choice in the face of the multiple and complex problems that he faced.

“As we went to independence, it was during the Cold War and both the West (centred around the American-British capitalist system) and the East (that revolved around Russia’s communist system) were keen to aligning the new nations with either East or West,” said Prof Muriuki.

“We had plenty of spies from both sides. Particularly the CIA and MI5 were keen to neutralise radicals like Oginga Odinga, Achieng’ Oneko and Pio Gama Pinto.”

According to Prof Muriuki, the foreign spy agencies had their tentacles deep in government, and then Agriculture minister Bruce Mackenzie worked for the CIA, the Mossad, MI5 and even the South Africans.

Wanted to secede

Kenyatta’s situation was not helped by the fact that the economy needed propping, the Shifta war (of 1963 to 1967 where ethnic Somalis in Kenya wanted to secede and join the greater Somali nation) was raging and the headache of absorbing unemployed youth into the economy to stem a Mau Mau type of unrest.

“He saw that probably a lot of that support would come from Britain. You remember that he had spent a lot of time there and even married an English girl. In terms of training and socialising, he was pro-West,” said Prof Muriuki. “He retained the House Speaker and others … even his presidential escort commander was an officer named Bob Morgan … a man who used to clobber us a lot before independence.”

Veteran journalist Philip Ochieng’ says it was never obvious to the ordinary person how foreign powers operated their spy networks in Kenya.

“With hindsight, we now know that we got our independence awash with British, American and Israeli intelligence. At that time, we would not have imagined it,” said Mr Ochieng’ who worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at independence.

He said an American diplomat had befriended him and the two had become drinking buddies for almost two years.

Prominent agents

“I was later shocked when I read his name in a book by Philip Agee that he was one of the prominent agents. His name, too, was Philip,” Mr Ochieng’ told the Sunday Nation.

He was referring to the 1975 book Inside the Company: CIA Diary which identified about 250 officers, front companies and foreign agents working for the US.

The exposés of Mr Agee and others inspired by his work led Congress to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, which made it a crime to intentionally reveal the identity of a covert intelligence officer.

So dependent on British intelligence had the Kenyatta government become that when the former colonial masters made changes in their security structures and withdrew some of the support, Kenya’s spy chief James Kanyotu was reported to have been “very resentful” of the way the changes had been made.

But the colonialists had perfected surveillance on Kenyans and their leaders way before Mzee Kenyatta took power.

Before independence, the MI5 had used unorthodox means to spy on the Kenyan delegation at the Lancaster Conference which negotiated Kenya’s independence at different times between 1961 and 1963.

The spies then turned over the information to British officials ahead of meetings to give them an advantage at the negotiations.

Specifically, the British wished to keep at bay any communist tendencies, which they felt would jeopardise their huge commercial, strategic and farming interests in Kenya.

The firebrand

Mr Odinga was a specific target of British spying during the Lancaster negotiations because of his “firebrand” nature. His connections with the Communist Party of Great Britain were particularly viewed with great suspicion by the colonialists.

A recorded telephone conversation showed Mr Odinga had reached out to Britain’s Communist Party for help in drafting a party constitution.

“There was much in the uncompromising programme of Odinga’s Kanu, founded after the Lancaster House conference, of which the Communist Party of Great Britain advisers undoubtedly approved,” says the book.

“Unlike the more moderate Kadu, Kanu demanded the confiscation of all settler estates and property, the ending of foreign investment and the nationalisation of industry.”

The man the British had mistakenly labelled the mastermind of the Mau Mau — Mzee Kenyatta — “proved instead to be a master of magnanimity.”

In October 1963, Mr Kenyatta had fully taken charge of affairs and led the delegation that returned to Lancaster to negotiate for full independence. As it turned out, this delegation was also kept under surveillance by British spies and the information passed on to the colonial negotiators.

“The Security Service was informed by a colonial office official that Duncan Sandys, Secretary of the State for Commonwealth Relations ‘attached great importance to the service of intelligence we were giving him about the activities and views of the delegates to the Kenya conference,’” writes Prof Andrew.

But Mr Sandys caused great discomfort at the negotiations. One of his Cabinet colleagues complained “Sandys had risked compromising intelligence by referring to some of it during the negotiations”.

Next Sunday, read the account of how British spies flew to Lamu in an effort to establish the identities of terrorists out of the UK bombed by Americans in Somalia in January 2007.