Kenya had to move in and stop Al-Shabaab’s ‘bandit economy’
What you need to know:
- In fact this piracy had itself become a serious problem for Kenya. It was driving up insurance and other shipping costs and generally interfering with Kenya’s maritime trade
- Kenya had also to endure waves upon waves of Somali refugees, some of who were not content to remain in the Dadaab camps
Those busy questioning why the Kenyan army is in Somalia fall into two categories: those who are simply ignorant and those serving a pan-Somali agenda.
Tetu MP Ndung’u Gethinji, who chairs the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations, recently gave the most lucid rationale I have heard so far for the military intervention (I am not sure, though, that his television interviewers grasped the nitty-gritty).
You can start by dismissing completely the notion that the invasion was due to the cross-border abductions of some aid workers and tourists. That was merely the trigger Kenya had been waiting for.
Over time, lawless Somalia had degenerated into what Mr Gethinji bluntly termed a “bandit economy”. That was the crux of our problem. Huge, unregulated, untaxed consignments of goods were pouring in from next door, negatively affecting Kenya’s own economy. It was also harming some key industries, particularly sugar factories.
Worse still was the unregulated flow of mysterious capital from Somalia.
This was playing havoc with our country’s economic fundamentals, especially with regard to real estate prices in Nairobi.
When the government tried to initiate a proper audit of the property market, it was answered with a loud outcry from Kenyan ethnic Somalis. The community also rejected out of hand suspicions that this flood of capital was coming, at least in part, from the proceeds of sea piracy in the Indian Ocean.
In fact this piracy had itself become a serious problem for Kenya. It was driving up insurance and other shipping costs and generally interfering with Kenya’s maritime trade.
To be sure, Al-Shabaab was not a direct player in the piracy business. Most of the pirates come from the Puntland region in the Garowe area.
Nonetheless, Al-Shabaab was generally a menace in as far as it allowed this bandit economy to flourish.
Kenya had also to endure waves upon waves of Somali refugees, some of who were not content to remain in the Dadaab camps.
I have an acquaintance who has done a lot of business in these camps. Camp residents would sell blankets and foodstuffs delivered by UNHCR, and the stuff would find its way to Nairobi.
And not only refugees were crossing over. Plenty of firearms, too, were coming in and falling into criminal hands.
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All along, it was a matter of when, not if, Kenya would make a move. It was necessary to create a buffer, which some are calling Jubaland.
I have a cousin who has for many years worked in Somalia and knows the mindset intimately. The moment Kenya invaded, he warned me that Somalis of every hue would react furiously, including Kenyan Somalis. Indeed, much of the vocal opposition locally to Kenya’s intervention has come from ethnic Somalis.
One problem is that Somalis tend to regard themselves as different from other Africans. Somalia likes being counted as a member of the Arab League. The only other non-Arab countries in Africa that prefer to be in the Arab League are Comoros and Djibouti, which is itself ethnic Somali.
It can’t simply be about religion that Somalia feels it belongs in the Arab League. Persian Iran, to give just one example, is predominantly Muslim, too, yet it has never seen the need to join the Arab League. The bottom line is that the League is for Arabs. Those who seek to join up obviously must feel they are part of that family.
Lately, Kenya and the UN have indicated that Al-Shabaab could be behind increased ivory poaching in East Africa. Getting into the illegal ivory market is one of the ways the group has been financing its activities.
