Reforming African Union will be a tough call

From left: Rwanda's president Paul Kagame, Senegal's president Macky Sall, Mali's president Ibrahima Boubacar Keita and president of the Commission of African Union (AU) Moussa Faki Mahamat attend the opening of the 4th Summit on Peace and Security on November 13, 2017 in Dakar. PHOTO | SEYLLOU | AFP

What you need to know:

  • At the core of the changes that could reorder the AU and Africa is Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who takes the helm as the rotating chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.  
  • Against criticism of the AU as an inefficient and dysfunctional body, Paul Kagame was picked to oversee reforms.

  • A number of questions hang over the anticipated reforms and Kagame’s leadership.

As is tradition, Addis Ababa has this week been the epicentre of continental politics, with activities culminating in the annual heads of state and government summit Sunday and Monday.

While the African Union’s conclaves have always trained focus on issues defining the continent’s geopolitics, the 2018 edition may signal new pathways in Africa’s engagements with itself and external partners.

At the core of the potential changes that could reorder the AU and Africa is Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who takes the helm as the rotating chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.  

While he would merely be a leader among equals as the periodic chairperson, Kagame’s one-year stint is potentially far-reaching in its significance.

Against criticism of the AU as an inefficient and dysfunctional body, Kagame was picked to oversee reforms.

REFORMS

Notably, the July 2016 AU summit during which he was endorsed to champion the specialised reform docket was at the newly-completed Kigali Convention Centre.

Kagame and a panel of experts announced a raft of recommendations in January 2017.

The upshot is that President Kagame will be chaperoning, perhaps, enforcing the very reform agenda that he initiated, with January 2019 as the deadline for completion of key aspects of the changes.

Significant among them is the resolution that member states contribute to the funding of the AU by levying 0.2 per cent on imports.

In this scheme, the continent would finance its budget. Equally revolutionary is the alignment and streamlining of the lumbering AU structures to do away with duplication of roles. A leaner AU would focus on defined goals rather than attempt to be-all and end-all of Africa’s needs.

A number of questions hang over the anticipated reforms and Kagame’s leadership.

BIG TASK

Indeed, reports on the reforms by no less than Kagame himself have demonstrated sensitivity to potentially sticking points.

Having succeeded on the economic front back home, Kagame is taking on a big task that will need continental sensibilities.   

Success or failure will revolve around various factors. One needs to take stock of the complexity of the 55-nation AU marked by national and regional interests.

Kagame will have to enlist the unambiguous support of most of his colleagues including managing the egos — particularly those of “big” countries. The downsizing of AU will likely touch off resistance from bureaucrats at the Addis secretariat. Some may well balk at the proposal for fast-tracked reforms such as the one-year deadline for key changes to be put in place.

Though it is understood that a Reform Implementation Unit has been established under the office of African Union Commission boss Moussa Faki, Kagame’s hands-on approach could be frowned on by officials leading AU organs.

RESOLUTIONS

Consider for instance, President Kagame’s view that the secretariat will forthwith be required to implement heads of state resolutions to the letter! It is a hint that the powers and jobs of some in the secretariat will be on the chopping board. 

From an external perspective, the challenge that will call for dextrous navigation is the focus on an efficient, self-financing and  independent AU.

Obviously, aid is a tool of foreign policy which suggests that the US, Britain, France, the EU, China, Japan, Russia and others will keep an eye on what the reforms mean for their fortunes.

Tomes have been written on how an ineffective AU serves the interests of powerful global hegemons. Indeed, one of Kagame’s reform reports states that “there have been expressions of polite surprise, bordering on discomfort, from external parties” because the “reform is real and irreversible”.

As the school of realism in international relations makes clear, global powers are unlikely to sit on their hands as a hitherto supplicant Africa takes assertive stances on any number of hot-button issues.

In the final analysis, the reforms will need a huge dose of high-stakes strategy to succeed.